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ABSTRACT

Franklin, Janet A. M.A. Department of History, Wright State University, 2019. United
States Foreign Policies on Iran and Iraq, and the Negative Impact on the Kurdish
Nationalist Movement: From the Nixon Era through the Reagan Years.

United States foreign policies on Iran and Iraq, during the later Cold War period,
led to devastating consequences to Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and a separate
nation-state. By employing the Shah of Iran as one pillar of America’s proxy in the
Persian Gulf, and after the Iranian Revolution, to then begin collaborating with Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq War, U.S. policies marginalized and negatively impacted Iraqi
Kurds’ goal of independence.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Iraqi Kurds began lining up in front of polling places throughout the Kurdistan
Region, Iraq, at 8 a.m. (local time) on September 25, 2017. Armed with fresh victories
against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) forces while assisting the Iraqi
government win back territory lost to that militant group, the Iraqi Kurds felt their time
had once again arrived to assert for self-governance. The September 2017 election called
for a vote on an advisory referendum, which would give the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) a mandate to achieve independence from Iraq. 1 Overwhelmingly
approved by 92.73 percent of the 3,305,925 eligible voters, the Iraqi Kurds felt sure they
secured the pathway towards self-rule. 2 Instead of accepting the legal right of
expression, as exercised by the people of the Kurdistan Region in passing the advisory
referendum, the Iraqi government deemed the vote unconstitutional and considered the
move as a crime. 3 Taking further action, Iraq sent forces into the region seizing the city
of Kirkuk and other towns and cities, along with multiple oil fields, in the semiautonomous region. 4 The United States, yet again, stood aside with the view that an

1
Tamara Qiblawi, “Iraqi Kurdish referendum: What you need to know,” CNN, Irbil, Iraq, updated 5:10 PM
ET, Sun September 24, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/24/middleeast/kurdish-referendum/index.html
(accessed May 4, 2019).
2
KRG Cabinet, “KHERC: Yes wins by 92.73 percent at Kurdistan independence referendum,” Kurdistan
Regional Government, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq (cabinet.gov.krd), Thu, 28 Sep 2017 15:00,
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=55861 (accessed May 4, 2019).
3
KRG Cabinet, “KRG Council of Ministers statement on Baghdad’s unconstitutional acts,” Kurdistan
Regional Government, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq (cabinet.gov.krd), Fri, 29 Sep 2017 11:40,
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=55878 (accessed May 4, 2019)
4
Jane Arraf, “After Iraqi Kurdish Independence Vote Backfires, ‘I Do Not Regret It,’ Says Barzani,” NPR,
Politics & Policy, November 7, 2017, 1:11 PM ET,
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/11/07/562514981/after-iraqi-kurdish-independence-votebackfires-i-do-not-regret-it-says-barzani (accessed May 4, 2019).
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autonomous Kurdistan Region would destabilize the entire Middle East. 5 Although a
supporter of Iraqi Kurdish fighters against ISIS, the U.S. remained diplomatically
detached and offered no advocacy for Kurdish statehood. 6 A continuing pattern, the
United States once more employed the Iraqi Kurds in fighting a perceived U.S. threat in
the Persian Gulf region, currently ISIS, but averted the Iraqi Kurds’ long held quest for a
separate nation-state. Much of the deterrents to Kurdish self-rule in Iraq are enmeshed in
policies established and imposed by American interventions in the region. This study
examines American foreign relations with Iran and Iraq, during the Nixon administration
through the Reagan era, and the detrimental impact American policy had on the
aspirations of Iraqi Kurds for statehood. During this period, Iran shifted from ally to foe;
conversely, Iraq transformed from being a Cold War opponent to a collaborator. The
shifts in American foreign policies on Iran and Iraq marginalized and negatively
impacted Iraqi Kurds’ goal of independence.

5

Krishnadev Calamur, “Why Doesn’t the U.S. Support Kurdish Independence?” The Atlantic, Global, Oct
20, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/us-kurdish-independence/543540/
(accessed May 4, 2019).
6
Calamur, “Why Doesn’t U.S. Support Kurdish Independence.”
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Figure 1. Autonomous Region
Kurdistan. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/74/Autonomous_R
egion_Kurdistan-en.png/375px-Autonomous_Region_Kurdistan-en.png

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In reviewing the literature, scholars of American foreign policy throughout the
Cold War era have tended to depict the Kurdish nationalist movement as incidental in
comparison to state actors. Rashid Khalidi, Michael A. Palmer, Daniel J. Sargent, and
Odd Arne Westad represent a few researchers that discuss the Cold War period and
mention the Kurds in terms of their ancillary roles in the wars between Iran and Iraq. In
Iran, for example, academics perceived the Kurds as constituting a segment of the overall
Iranian population. Research into U.S.-Iranian relations treated the Kurds as one
3

minority group of several under the jurisdiction of the Iranian government, and treatment
of U.S.-Kurdish relations resided as subset of the larger U.S.-Iranian policy. The Iraqi
Kurds were viewed in a similar manner. Although recognition of the nationalist
movement played a minor role in U.S.-Iraqi relations, the Iraqi Kurds held a negligible
position to the larger U.S. policy on Iraq. The materials utilized in this examination draw
primarily from United States foreign policies on Iran and Iraq to elucidate the resulting
effects on the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq. Sources in this study, gathered from
U.S. government documents, American newspaper articles, and books, address a series of
questions that explore the changing dynamics of U.S.-Iranian and U.S.-Iraqi relations
from 1969-1988, and how the shifts obstructed Iraqi Kurdish aims for statehood.
Prior to America’s 2011 withdrawal from Iraq after the Iraq War (2003-2011), the
region of Kurdistan subsisted geographically, economically, and politically marginalized.
The Kurdistan region also lacked formal institutions to compile and house historical
documents and artifacts, which hampered comprehensive inquiry. More important,
however, the provocative, rebellious behavior of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the
associated countries created enormous difficulties in obtaining research materials, and
thus made scholarship difficult. The end of the Iraq War and the toppling of Saddam
Hussein’s regime opened previously unavailable research opportunities by providing a
safer environment and more open lines of communication between Iraqi Kurdistan and
the West.
One of the few researchers to explore the direct connection between the United
States and the Kurds was Marianna Charountaki, an international relations scholar. Her
book, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International relations in the Middle East since

4

1945, examined U.S.-Kurdish relations by primarily focusing on the Kurd’s influence on
American foreign policy from World War II until Gulf War III (March 2003).
Charountaki’s expanded edition of her Ph.D. thesis (2009) concentrated on the
interdependence of non-state and state actors in international relations. She explained the
Kurdish issue as multifaceted and complex in nature with internal and external
dimensions that are dependent on the regional state powers. 7 Charountaki analyzed the
structure of American foreign policy making, particularly in how the formulating of
policy related to non-state powers, in this case the Kurds, within the paradigm of
increasing globalization. 8 In covering a span of fifty eight years, she discussed pertinent
periods of discourse and action to include the first direct meeting between U.S.
government officials and Kurdish leaders in 1972, and the 1988 U.S. Congressional Bill
authorizing sanctions against Iraq for the use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds.
Charountaki also covered the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, and delineated how the Kurdish
groups in each of the four countries have frequently been at odds, often exacerbated by
regional and international powers. 9 She relied on interviews with pertinent KDP, PUK,
and KRG members and other Kurdish officials, U.S. governmental electronic sources,
and U.S. congressional records and reports, along with periodicals, newspapers, and other
media.
While Charountaki discussed the Kurdish Issue in international relations terms,
Mehrdad R. Izady and David McDowall chronicled the history of the Kurds. Izady’s The
Kurds: A Concise Handbook offered a primer on the Kurds, presenting a full range of

7

Marianna Charountaki, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International relations in the Middle East
since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 28.
8
Charountaki, Kurds US Foreign Policy, 70.
9
Ibid., 182.
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themes from geographical information to cultural and arts material. Although the book
lacked a comprehensive bibliography, Izady incorporated documentation on the ancient
and modern sources he used at the end of each chapter. Notably, Izady delineated all of
the Kurdish tribes and utilized his cartography skills to include numerous maps. In
addition, he presented detailed information on Kurdish religions, and described the high
status given women in the Cult of Angels, which is one of several indigenous Kurdish
faiths. Also, he defined the importance of women in politics and the military. In a
section on the Kurdish national character, Izady attributed the faults of Mullah Mustafa
Barzani to less admirable traits of the Kurds in general.
Where Izady lacked information on contemporary political developments,
McDowall’s The Modern History of the Kurds chronicled the history of the Kurds
concentrating on the nineteenth through the late twentieth century. McDowall paid
particular attention to the nationalist movement, citing primary sources from the Public
Record office in Great Britain and the United Nations, and incorporated secondary
sources to include newspapers and periodicals. In detail, McDowall reported on the
internal struggles and rivalries within Kurdish society, along with the convergence of old
tribal systems within the changing dynamics of newly established modern states. Similar
to Charountaki, McDowall highlighted the complexities of the nationalist movement
within the context of regional governments, but he concentrated on the Kurdish
perspective with comprehensive narratives on the development and interplay of the
numerous nationalist movement groups. McDowall, in his third edition of The Modern
History of the Kurds, included appendices on the Kurds in Syria, Lebanon, and the
Caucasus, which largely are absent from other studies.

6

The works of Marianna Charountaki, Mehrdad R. Izady, and David McDowall
primarily covered the Kurds and the overall Kurdish nationalist movement. Ofra
Bengio’s The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State offered an examination of
the Iraqi Kurdish drive for autonomy, and discussed the role the Kurdish movement
played in shaping the ultimate collapse of the Baʿthist regime. Exploring the internal and
external deterrents to Kurdish nation building, Bengio assessed the degree to which the
Iraqi Kurds succeeded. Bengio utilized sources from British and Baʿthist archives; Iraqi
and Kurdish newspapers; and, Baʿth and Kurdish documents, speeches by public figures,
and official declarations to argue that the Iraqi Kurds continue to hold a crucial role in
Iraq’s state building, especially after the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett’s Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to
Dictatorship, a comprehensive study ranging from 1958 through 1991, chronologically
surveyed the history, politics, and international relations of Iraq. While Bengio
emphasized the impact of the Kurds on Iraqi politics, Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett
provided a more comprehensive view on Iraq, giving particular attention to the Iraqi
Communist Party, fluctuating policies concerning the Kurds and Shi’a, and regional
tensions. The Slugletts posited that the attitudes of the various Iraqi administrations
towards the Kurds were pragmatic and contentious in nature. While different regimes
attempted variously to incorporate the movement leaders into coalition governments,
offer a form of Kurdish autonomy, and force displacement of the Iraqi Kurds, the
Slugletts offered a neutral position on the nationalist movement. They neither described
the Kurds as victims nor as glorified rebels. The Slugletts used unpublished theses,

7

newspapers, and an array of secondary sources, along with their own research, to present
a socioeconomic history of Iraq.
Phebe Marr’s third edition of The Modern History of Iraq also reviewed the
history of Iraq, but highlighted Iraq’s pursuit of a national identity and struggle for
modernity. Marr began her study with the monarchial period (1921), after providing a
brief historical synopsis of the land and people of Iraq, and carried her examination
through 2011. Contributing to the current literature on Iraq by scrutinizing economic and
social changes occurring during the twentieth century, Marr delved into the relationships
between Sunni and Shi’a, and Arab and Kurd, along with the political dimensions
enmeshed in the development of the state. She described the Kurdish nationalist
movement, in balanced terms, as one of several factors eroding national unity. Marr
capitalized on her own research, memoirs, works in Arabic, as well as English and other
Western languages sources.
Taking a slightly different approach to Marr, Tripp’s second edition of A History
of Iraq examined the country through the lenses of patrimonialism, the political economy
of oil, and the use of violence in the making of modern day Iraq. According to Tripp,
“Indeed, control of the means of violence has been one of the lures for those who seized
the state apparatus.” 10 Tripp discussed the military and economic power of the Sunni
Arab minority over the majority Shi’a and Kurdish populations, often with severe
consequences. He demonstrated the use of governmental violence against the citizenry
by relating the experiences of the Iraqi Kurds to include forceful expulsions, mass
executions, and gassing of whole villages. Tripp utilized archival records housed in

10

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6.
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England, India, and the United States, and cited numerous memoirs and secondary
sources in his narrative.
The perspectives presented by the preceding authors centered on the Iraqi Kurds
and Iraq, specifically the Kurdish influence in the region. Roham Alvandi’s Nixon,
Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War took a different
position that assessed U.S.-Iranian relations, which implicated the Kurdish nationalist
movement during the Shatt al-‘Arab border dispute (1969-1975). Alvandi challenged the
view that the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was America’s proxy in the Persian
Gulf region. He posited that the Shah developed a partnership with President Richard
Nixon and Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor, to contain Soviet influence
and establish Iran as the regional leader. Alvandi illuminated the view from Tehran of
U.S.-Iranian relations and the crucial role the Iraqi Kurds played in the Shah’s political
maneuverings. 11 He used Persian-language sources, declassified presidential papers, and
documents produced by Kissinger and Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
(1966-1973) to assert his viewpoint.
Bryan R. Gibson’s Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold
War asserted that U.S. policy toward Iraq, between 1958 and 1975, was based on Cold
War concerns and denying Soviet influence in the country. He demonstrated how
reliance on the Pike Report, the findings of the 1975 Pike Committee, headed by U.S.
Representative Otis G. Pike, distorted historians perception of the events during the
period. The report claimed that secret U.S. financial support was given to the Iraqi
Kurds. Gibson used declassified government materials, interviews with government

11

Janet A. Franklin, “Final Essay: The First Exploitation of the Kurds by the United States: 1972” (HST
7330-01, December 17, 2015), 2.

9

officials, and numerous secondary sources to redress historiographical deficiencies, and
to provide a more accurate account of how U.S. decisions and actions were based on a
“single, unifying perception: the Soviet Union posed a threat to Iraq’s sovereignty.” 12
Bruce W. Jentleson’s With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam,
1982-1990 maintained that the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations towards
Iraq were based on flawed assumptions. Where Gibson highlighted weaknesses in
historiography, Jentleson asserted that both presidents made conjectures based on the
premise that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” 13 According to Jentleson, Reagan
and Bush devised policies on the basic presumption that Saddam Hussein would pivot
towards the United States during the period of the Iran-Iraq War, and by doing so,
provide regional stability by ceasing to instigate terrorism and playing a role in ArabIsraeli peace settlements. Jentleson employed government documents, interviews,
hearing transcripts, and newspaper articles to present his argument.
This study contributes to the existing literature on the subject of how United
States foreign policies in Iran and Iraq negatively impacted the Kurdish nationalist
movement in Iraq during the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy
Carter, and Ronald Reagan. By chronologically examining the policy decisions
employed during the sixteen year period, a picture emerged of the detrimental effects of
those strategies on the Iraqi Kurds’ ambition for statehood. The primary sources used in
this paper include declassified government documents electronically obtained from the
Foreign Relations of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Freedom of

12

Bryan R. Gibson, Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), xxii.
13
Bruce W. Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1994), 15.
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Information Act Electronic Reading Room, and electronic copies of reports obtained
from the United Nations Security Council. In addition, articles from the village VOICE
and the New York Times offered pertinent government disclosures, and interviews with
federal and military officials, respectively, from the Nixon and Reagan administrations.
The memoirs of Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger provide first hand perspectives
of key government officials from the beginning of direct U.S.-Kurdish relations. The
materials utilized in this examination bring to light an evolving U.S. strategy in policy
making concerning the region.

11

II.

THE KURDS

“No friends but the mountains” is a common refrain heard expressed about, and
by, the Kurds. The Zagros Mountains, extending from southeast Turkey, through
northeast Iraq, and running down along the western border of Iran to the Strait of
Hormuz, offered sanctuary to the various Kurdish tribes in times of conquests, conflicts,
and threats from perceived enemies for more than four millennia. Although they are one
of a multitude of groups worldwide pursuing independence and statehood, such as the
Palestinians, the Basque, the Tibetans, and the Rohingyas, the Kurds assert a special
distinction as being “the world’s largest ethnic group without their own homeland,”
according to The Kurdish Project, a digital based cultural-education initiative to raise
awareness of Kurdish people. 14 The northern regions of the Zagros, an unhospitable
expanse, provided the Kurds with not only shelter, but allowed for the continuation of
their semi-nomadic lifestyle.
Claiming lineage from the ancient Medes, a people of Indo-Iranian origin, whom
they proudly proclaim ancestry in the Kurdish national anthem, the Kurds are more likely
an intermingling of various peoples moving through the Kurdistan region in prehistoric
times. 15 One of several Kurdish origin myths include the Kurds descending from

14
The Kurdish Project, “Latest News, For Iraq’s Long-Suffering Kurds, Independence Beckons,” posted
September 11, 2017, https://thekurdishproject.org/latest-news/iraqs-long-suffering-kurds-independencebeckons/ (accessed September 29, 2017).
15
Dildar (Yonis Reuf), “Ey Reqîb (Kurdish national anthem),” Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iraq, KDP
International Site, http://www.kdp.se/lder.html (accessed October 1, 2017).
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children who escaped into the mountains to hide from Zahhak, a child-eating monster. 16
Another legend claims the Kurds are the progenies of jinn, supernatural creatures, and
slave girls from King Solomon’s court driven into the mountains by the angry king. 17
Called Cyrtii in the second century, a name initially applied to Seleucid or Parthian
mercenary slinger (those trained in using slings as weapons), it is unclear if the term
specified a distinctive linguistic or ethnic group. 18 But by the seventh century CE, at the
beginning of the Islamic era, the Arabs who conquered the region started using the term
“Kurds,” which held a socio-economic meaning, to refer to the area’s mountain people.
Among leading Muslim historians in the tenth century CE, the use of “Kurds” to refer to
the Zagros inhabitants became more widespread, thus helping to propagate the name. 19
Essentially, the Kurds are an Indo-European speaking people, closely related culturally
and linguistically to the Iranian peoples. 20 As a non-Arab ethnic group, they inhabit a
contiguous area of southeastern Turkey, western Iran, northern Syria, and northern Iraq.
While many languages are spoken in the Kurdish regions, the main Kurdish
dialects are Kurmanji, Sorani, and Southern Kurdish. Kurmanji, used most prevalently in
the northern sections of Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, and Turkey, is spoken by
approximately 65 percent of all Kurds. In Iraq, Kurmanji is known as “Behdini.” 21
Sorani is commonly spoken in parts of Iraq and Iran. According to The Kurdish Project,
less than 25 percent of all Kurds speak Sorani, but it is “the dialect with the most well

16

David McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), 4.
Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: the Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and
Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.
18
McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 9.
19
Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 2.
20
Gunter, Kurds Ascending, 1.
21
The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-culture/kurdish-language/
(accessed January 29, 2018).
17
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developed literary tradition in modern times.” 22 The regions with Sorani speakers
allowed for the dialect to be taught and used in the educational systems, hence the
advancement of Sorani literary. Southern Kurdish, the third regional dialect, is
comprised of nine subdialects spoken in Iran and parts of Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG), established in 1992 as a Parliamentary Democracy within the
federated Republic of Iraq, recognizes both Kurmanji and Sorani. 23
Similar to the differences in languages, various religions are practiced among the
Kurds to include Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The majority of Kurds identify as
Sunni Muslims with a minority being Shi’a, or approximately 15 percent of the total
Kurdish population. 24 Alevism, a branch of Shi’a Islam that incorporates Sufism, the
mystical element of Islam, is also practiced by a small segment of Kurds, particularly in
Turkey. An even smaller group of Kurds adhere to Yezidism, a conglomeration of
ancient pagan beliefs, Zoroastrianism and Mithraism, Manichaean gnosis (founded by the
Iranian prophet Mani, c. 216-276 CE), and superimposed with elements of Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. 25 Until the creation of Israel, the region of Kurdistan held a
significant minority of Kurdish Jews, but most emigrated to Israel after World War II. 26
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Christian organizations in Europe and the
United States revived interest in carrying missionary work to the Kurdistan region. 27

22

The Kurdish Project
Ibid.
24
McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 11.
25
Ibid.
26
Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington, D.C.: Taylor & Francis International
Publishers, 1992), 162.
27
Izady, Kurds, 164.
23
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Today, approximately 25 to 35 million Kurds live in the region of Kurdistan, and
make up the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. 28 In Iraq, the Kurdish
population is estimated to be 15 to 20 percent of the total populace. The region of Iraqi
Kurdistan, located in the north of Iraq and often referred to as Southern Kurdistan, is
governed by the KRG. Its capital is Erbil. Today, the KRG and the U.S. enjoy an open
and favorable relationship.

Figure 2. Map of Iraq. https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iraq.html

28

“Who are the Kurds?” BBC News, October 31, 2017, under “News World Middle East,”
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440 (accessed December 3, 2017).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, of which the Kurds were a part, marked the
beginning of greater Western influence in the territories formerly occupied by the
caliphate. Sensing an eventual victory in World War I, the United Kingdom and France
with approval from the Russian Empire, secretly agreed to the Sykes-Picot Agreement
(1916), an arrangement that allocated spheres of influence and control in the Ottoman
controlled regions of the Middle East. After the war’s end, the Allied Powers formulated
a partitioning plan, The Treaty of Sevres (1920), based on the Sykes-Picot. The
agreement incorporated a provision for an independent Kurdistan, but disputes over
boundary lines and a Turkish rebellion nullified the treaty. Consequently, the Treaty of
Lausanne (1923) officially formalized the division of the former empire, and divided up
the Kurdistan region leaving the Kurds without a self-ruled state. Instead, Kurdish
territory was allocated to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. 29 During the post war
negotiations, the majority of Kurds had not fully rallied around a political, nationalist
leader or unified around a common nationalistic cause. A newly emerging non-tribal
educated professional class had not yet marshalled the Kurds as a unified people to
advocate for a separate, autonomous state. 30 Tribal structure, intertribal differences, and
poor communications factored greatly into the state of Kurdish affairs.
The interwar period, from the Treaty of Lausanne to the onset of World War II,
found the appointed central governments controlling the Kurdistan regions attempting to
crush, suppress, or mute Kurdish political power and nationalist activities. Pockets of
Kurdish resistance to regional authorities persisted, as it had during the Ottoman reign,
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but fresh uncertainties rising from the evolving political realities of the new regimes now
in control magnified the struggle. The Treaty of Sevres had, after all, acknowledged
Kurdish aims for an independent state on an international level. As with many entities
forming new power bases, a jostling for authority and control often leads to greater
marginalization of groups that previously held sway or some form of influence. The
Kurds exemplified that struggle to hold on to the little autonomy they possessed.
During the Ottoman period, the Kurds had established some semblance of selfrule within the central power structure, although they continued to push for greater
independence. The newly recognized governments of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq wrestled
with how to address their Kurdish populations within the regional dynamics existing at
the time. The main objective in both Turkey and Iran rested on exerting central authority
throughout the entire state. Turkey expunged all references to Kurdistan from official
records, renamed Kurdish places in Turkish, demanded the sole use of Turkish in courts
of law, and officially barred the use of Kurdish dialects in schools. 31 As well, the
Turkish government embarked on a program of resettling Kurds in non-Kurdish western
regions of the country. 32 Clearly, the aim of Turkey’s government centered on creating a
single national identity—Turkish—to strengthen its position. The measures were
intended to assimilate the Kurds into the national Turkish character and deny them a
Kurdish identity, but the actions of the government had the opposite effect. Instead, the
push for a Turkish national identity helped intensify the Kurdish nationalist movement.
Because of the denial of a Kurdish identity, along with a lack of any economic
development in Turkey’s Kurdistan region after the war, a Kurdish nationalist movement
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there developed along different lines. As such, this paper addresses only the Kurdish
nationalist movement as it pertains to Iraqi Kurds.
KURDS IN IRAN
In Iran, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds experienced a similar,
but less severe, pattern of treatment as the Turkish Kurds. The Iranian central
government, a theocratic regime led by Reza Shah Pahlavi, held that the Kurds shared
Persian ancestry, therefore no overt need to extinguish Kurdish identity. But that
common ancestry still excluded Iranian Kurds, who made up approximately 7 percent of
the Iranian population, from participation in politics, and the prohibition of the Kurdish
dialects in education, publications, and public speech. 33 As Reza Shah amassed his
power, he put into place new policies that forced young men into conscription, demanded
a uniform European dress code, changed land registration laws to favor local aghas (tribal
chieftains or village leaders), prohibited tribal migration, and attempted to disarm the
tribes on the border regions. 34 He also embarked on modernization programs that
benefited urban areas, but left the mountainous countryside untouched. In essence, Reza
Shah enacted strict measures to subordinate the Kurds to central authority. Again, the
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran diverged from that experienced in other regions of
Kurdistan, thus a discussion on Iranian Kurds will give way to the Iraqi Kurdish
nationalist movement.
KURDS IN IRAQ
In Iraq, created under British mandate in 1921, the Kurds fared better than their
counterparts in other regions of Kurdistan. Although the Kurds assumed autonomy
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would be granted through the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey’s rebellion and subsequent
independence left the treaty unratified and placed into question the jurisdiction of the
Kurdish vilayet (province) of Mosul. In the debate on the disposition of Mosul, the
British questioned their initial backing of an independent Kurdish state, which would
incorporate the vilayet, and what that would do to the stability of an emerging proWestern Turkey. Also, London knew of significant oil fields in the Mosul region. At
that time, oil was just becoming an ever more crucial commodity that Western powers
deemed necessary for the security. If Mosul went to Turkey, it would mean losing the
most oil productive region of Iraq. Unsure of placing the province in an independent and
unpredictable Kurdish state, the prevailing thought in Britain eventually determined that
without Mosul, Iraq would suffer economically and put British interests at risk. 35 When
British-Turkish negotiations failed to reach an agreement on the vilayet, the Council of
the League of Nations, in 1926, conferred Mosul to Iraq with stipulations benefiting the
Kurds, specifically the Local Languages Law, allowing both Arabic and Kurdish as the
official languages, and political representation in the region. 36 Unfortunately for the Iraqi
Kurds, those guarantees failed to materialize in practice. Nonetheless, for the first time,
the Iraqi government acknowledged Kurdish cultural rights and separate identity. By the
time Iraq gained independence from Britain in 1932, numerous Kurdish tribal uprisings
befell the country as the Kurds rebelled against British and Arab rule. While Iraqi Kurds’
independent state folded before it had a chance to materialize, their ambitions for selfgovernance continued.
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During the same period, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq experienced tense relations with
one another as the Kurds used the porous borders to escape from the battles and
skirmishes they initiated, mainly against Iraq. The fleeing Kurds used the neighboring
territories as bases of operations and to regroup. As such, Turkey feared Iranian
incursions into Turkish territory to retaliate against the revolting Kurds concealed there,
while Iran felt threatened that the British in Iraq would do the same to them. 37 Initially,
each country utilized the Kurds to cause trouble with their neighbors. In July 1937,
however, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq agreed to a pact of cooperation and to abide by existing
borders, thus ending the practice of inciting the Kurds against each other. 38 The
agreement added another layer of difficulty for the Kurds struggling for autonomy as
their ability to freely flee across open borders no longer existed.
REBELLIOUS KURDS
While new state governments were dealing with their rebellious Kurdish
minorities, the Kurds were fighting internally among themselves. Various tribes were
contesting the influence of neighboring clans and pushing back against the current order
of affairs. Historically, tribalism played an integral part in the governance of the
Kurdistan region. Also, a new class of Kurdish urban intellectuals began questioning the
authority of tribal aghas and attempted to diminish rural power. At the same time, within
tribal groups, rival chiefs vied for control. Several Kurdish tribal leaders pushed for
greater political autonomy within their newly ascribed regions, while others preferred to
acquiesce to central authorities for the potential advantages of siding with the new
governments of Turkey and Iraq, and in Iran.
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Kurdish tribes possessed relative autonomy under Ottoman rule. With the
collapse of the empire, a few Kurdish tribal leaders saw an opportunity to press for selfrule. Shaikh Saʾid, a chief of the Sunni Naqshbandi Sufi order, led a rebellion against the
nascent republic of Turkey in 1925. 39 In Iran, Ismail Agha Simko, chief of the Shakkak
tribe, conducted several uprisings from 1920 to 1930, when he finally succumbed to
Iranian forces. 40 Shaikh Mahmoud of the Barzanji tribe, declared himself king of an
independent Kurdistan, in the Sulaymaniyah region, in 1922. Although the British made
Mahmoud governor of Sulaymaniyah for a short period of time, from 1922 until 1924, his
ultimate goal centered on creating an autonomous state. Shaikh Mahmoud’s ambitions
unsettled other Kurdish tribal leaders who saw his form of governance no less
authoritarian than that of the British or Iraqis. After a forceful removal by British and
Iraqi forces, Mahmoud continued to harass British and Iraqi authorities from an Iranian
base until his final capture in 1932. Unable to unify around a single, charismatic leader
with political savvy to rally the numerous tribes around a nationalist movement, the
Kurds lost out to larger, regional powers.
IMPORTANCE OF OIL AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COLD WAR
After World War I and the lead up to World War II, American interests in the
Middle East hinged on commercial interests rather than on security concerns. Oil, the
new source of energy, powered the military victory of the Allies in the Great War and
helped shape the division of the region afterwards. The United States neither declared
war on the Ottomans nor participated in the League of Nations Treaty, and therefore
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reaped no benefits from the mandate system. 41 Instead, the U.S. deferred to Great
Britain’s political and military dominance in the Middle East, while at the same time
hoping to capitalize on the economic benefits from oil revenues. Although the U.S.
remained the largest producer and exporter of oil, American oil companies wanted in on
the commercial activities being negotiated in the Persian Gulf. 42 With the outbreak of
World War II, the subsequent decline in Britain’s economic power, and a renewed look at
the strategic importance of the Middle East, America’s interest in Persian Gulf oil
increased dramatically. 43 The United States government resolved to take a leading role in
the development of the Middle East oil industry.
In the direct aftermath of World War II, the U.S. concluded it was vital to national
security to safeguard access to the oil reserves in the Middle East and prevent the spread
of Soviet influence in the region. As part of the plan to secure these goals, the U.S.
reinvigorated the Arabian-America Oil Company (ARAMCO) with an innovative
financial agreement, dispatched U.S. Marines to occupy Beirut for three months to
suppress an uprising in 1958, and backed American friendly regimes in Jordan, Syria, and
the Persian Gulf. 44 Perhaps one of the most striking American actions involved the
authorizing of a 1953 joint clandestine operation, conducted by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service, to overthrow the
government of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Prime Minister of Iran. 45 Dwight D.
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Eisenhower’s administration feared Mosaddeq’s growing alliance with the communist
Tudeh Party and his increasing overtures to the Soviet Union for aid was an attempt to
open the door for a Soviet takeover of the Iranian pro-Western shah, Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi. 46 These American interests and actions in maintaining access to oil and
preventing the Soviets from expanding into the area ensnared the Kurdish nationalist
movement.
An early example of how the Soviets demonstrated their expansionist goals, and
in the process enmeshed the Kurds, occurred in a region encompassed by Iranian
Kurdistan. Allied forces had agreed to leave northern Iran within six months of the end
of World War II. March 2, 1946, was the departure deadline established by the
agreement. 47 The Americans pulled out ahead of time and the British withdrew on
schedule, but the Soviets capitalized on the opportunity and remained in the area.
Robert Rossow, Jr., American Vice-Consul in charge of the U.S. Consulate in Tabriz
(1945-1946), and Chief of the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (19461947), remarked, “One may fairly say that the Cold War began on March 4, 1946.” 48
Instead of departing on the prescribed date, the Soviets sent more troops into the region
two days later. Iranian Kurdistan’s significance pertained to its proximity to the Soviet
border, the potential of oil fields within its territory, and the political disruption caused by
Soviet encroachment into Iran, a sovereign nation. 49 Moscow’s actions, coupled with a
simultaneous and similar move on Turkey’s border, substantiated George Kennan’s, the
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American Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, warning of Soviet hostility towards the West in
his famous “Long Telegram.” During Soviet presence in the region, particularly from
December 1945 until Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin ordered his troops to leave in May
1946, the Soviets encouraged and protected a secessionist movement in Azerbaijan and in
Eastern Kurdistan. 50 A group of Kurdish nationalists, under the leadership of Qazi
Muhammad of Mahabad, took advantage of the political dynamics and reinvigorated the
early twentieth-century campaign for independence and statehood, much to the
consternation of the U.S., British, and Iranian governments because of direct Soviet
involvement. 51 With the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Kurdish nationalist movement
was effectively suppressed by the Iranian government on December 15, 1946. 52 From
the perspective of the United States, the expansionist behavior exhibited by the Soviets in
Iran justified a response in the newly developing Cold War strategy of containment. The
events described provide an early example of how the Iraqi Kurds entered into Cold War
rivalries.
REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD
The short lived Republic of Mahabad (1946) in Iranian Kurdistan, demonstrated
that a segment of the Kurdish population continued to harbor nationalist ambitions.
Instigated and supported by the Soviets, a group of leading Kurdish chiefs established a
self-governing region and set down a series of six objectives. The primary aim called for
autonomy for Iranian Kurds within the state of Iran. 53 The formation of the republic
started the coalescing of divergent Kurdish groups and set course for a more unified
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nationalist movement. Although the Republic of Mahabad lasted for less than a year, the
Iraqi Kurds, under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, immerged as a major force
in the campaign for self-rule.
THE COLD WAR AND REGIME CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Cold War marshaled in a new era of conflict that effected innumerable
amounts of changes and upheavals throughout the world. Older traditional systems of
governance collided with new ideologies causing governments worldwide to inwardly
reflect on how best to rebuild in the postwar environment. Leery of the Soviets during
wartime, the tensions between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics grew in intensity as the Soviet government pressed for legitimacy in the
international community. The Soviet system advocated an ideology of MarxismLeninism that centered on state control of property and economic activity, and challenged
America’s democratic institution which championed individual liberty and capitalism.
As demonstrated earlier in Iran, the Middle East became entangled in the ideological
battle between the two superpowers. The U.S. strategy of containment encompassed
shoring up regional governments that favored and supported American policy,
particularly those countries rich in oil reserves and that bordered the Soviet Union.
In addition to the global implications of the Cold War in the Middle East, the
creation of Israel in 1948 produced tremendous regional tensions and conflicts between
Arabs and Israelis. One of the outcomes of the formation of an independent Zionist state
resulted in a heightened awareness and the popularity of Arab nationalism, which gained
strength and pushed back against Western imperialism. Egypt’s Gamal Abd al-Nasser
proposed positive neutrality in the Cold War ideological battle in the Middle East, and
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actively pursued his nonalignment agenda. The region was fraught with discord. Some
independent states aligned with the West in the Cold War, while others adopted Nasser’s
stance of nonalignment, which afforded negotiations with the Soviet Union without
having to subscribe to their ideology. As well, a number of Middle Eastern countries
contested the regional powers of rivals. Many states suffered from internal dissentions as
various political factions vied for power within state governments, such as the civil war
in Lebanon, the coup in Iraq, and the struggles associated with the changing monarchy in
Jordan. All of this created global and regional levels of upheaval that drew in the Kurds.
Nearly landlocked, Iraq shares a common border with Iran. Since the sixteenth
century, the two countries have engaged in bitter territorial disputes over the Shatt alʿArab, which is Iraq’s only open water access. During the Mandate of Iraq, the thalweg
principle, a boundary established using the lowest part of the riverbed, determined the
border between the two countries, thus giving Iraq majority control over the waterway.
In 1937, after Iraq gained independence, Iran and Iraq signed the Iran-Iraq Frontier
Treaty acknowledging the official waterway divide between the two countries, although
some factions within the Iraqi government protested the agreement over losing some
control to Iran. 54 The signed treaty also paved the way for an alliance, the Saadabad Pact
(1937), between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, to counter Soviet encroachment.
Until the 1958 Iraqi military coup that toppled the monarchy, Iraq and Iran coexisted in
relative peace. The two countries, joined by Turkey, Pakistan, and Britain, formed the
Baghdad Pact (1955), an anti-Soviet defense partnership. 55 At the time, both Iraq and
Iran were steadfastly anti-communist and pro-Western. But the Iraqi coup brought to
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power ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim who established a new decisively anti-Western regime. 56 In
1959, Iraq broke with the Baghdad Pact. The new Iraqi regime increasingly turned to the
Soviet Union for foreign aid and military supplies. 57 Relations between Iraq and Iran
deteriorated rapidly in the evolving political atmosphere. The Iranian government of
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became progressively concerned that Qasim’s regime would
escalate the again contested Shatt al-ʿArab agreement, which could lead to all out warfare
between the two nations, and ultimately threaten the sovereignty of Iran. 58

Figure 3. Shatt al-ʿArab. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Iran-Iraq_Shatt_alArab_Boundries.jpg

When Qasim came to power, he offered amnesty to Mullah Mustafa Barzani,
Kurdish leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) founded in 1946, who had been
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in exile in the Soviet Union since 1946. 59 For Qasim, the 1958 move to bring Barzani
back was a means to help shore up his base within the Iraqi government. In Qasim’s
amnesty offer, he promised the Kurds a certain level of autonomy, but failed to carry
through with his pledge. As such, a deep chasm developed between the Iraqi government
and the Kurds, and open warfare eventually broke out in the early fall of 1961, mainly in
the northern tribal regions of Iraqi Kurdistan. 60 For Iran’s part, the Shah seized the
opportunity and initiated overtures of support to Barzani, by means of goods and arms, in
support of the Kurds’ rebellion against the Iraqi regime. 61 The Shah hoped to weaken
Iraq’s military abilities and to keep the Iraqi government preoccupied in Kurdistan. The
once congenial relationship between Iran and Iraq disintegrated into firm adversaries.
Within this Cold War and provincial milieu, the Kurdish nationalist movement disrupted
and became embroiled in internal politics in both Iran and Iraq.
The Iraqi break from the Baghdad Pact, and subsequent turn to the Soviets for
economic and military support, caused great consternation within the United States
government. Qasim’s attempt to strengthen his military regime with a number of internal
policies changes, such as land reform, revisions of the personal status law, and education
reform, instead instigated more religious and ethnic rebellions. 62 Internationally, Qasim
asserted claim to the newly independent state of Kuwait in June 1961, which he
proclaimed historically belonged to Iraq. He then passed Public Law 80, in December
1961, which effectively took 99.5 percent control of Iraq Petroleum Company’s (IPC)
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concession territory without compensation. 63 Qasim’s actions placed his regime in a
precarious situation both internally and internationally. The Kurdish uprising in the north
diminished his ability to act militarily on his claim to Kuwait. Internationally, the Kuwait
assertion and the removal of foreign control of oil placed Qasim’s government at odds
with Britain, the United States, and other Arab countries.
Qasim’s government was toppled in February 1963 by the Baʿthists. 64 The Baʿth,
meaning rebirth or resurrection, was a pan-Arab political party founded in Syria (1946)
that burgeoned in Iraq in the 1950s. 65 When the Baʿthists came into power, the U.S.
administration of Lyndon B. Johnson maintained a watchful eye on Iraq’s situation and
continued the U.S. policy of nonintervention, along with a passive support for Arab
unification, in which the new Iraqi regime was aligned. 66 The Six Day War (June 5-10,
1967), however, changed the dynamics between the United States and Iraq. The Iraqi
regime, having sent a token force in the battle between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan, severed all diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain because of
their complicit alignment with Israel during the war. 67
During Richard M. Nixon’s bid for the U.S. presidency, the Arab Socialist Baʿth
Party, led by Hasan al-Bakr, seized control of the Iraqi government. 68 On July 30, 1968,
just two weeks after grabbing power, al-Bakr expelled all non-Baʿthist allies from
political office. 69 For the next thirty-five years, the Baʿthists remained in control of the
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Iraqi government. The move also marked Saddam Hussein’s, al-Bakr’s kinsman, rise to
power.
While Iraq experienced numerous regime changes, Iranian-Iraqi affairs remained
adversarial, and U.S.-Iraqi diplomacy deteriorated, the United States and Iran
experienced a strengthening of ties. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the U.S. and Iran
enjoyed a cordial relationship. 70 After the forced abdication of his father during World
War II, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was installed on the throne and aligned his government
with the Allies. Subsequent to the Soviet incursion into Iran, along with other
antagonistic moves by the Soviets in Greece and Turkey (1946), President Harry S.
Truman announced, during his 1949 inaugural address, his Point Four Program. As part
of his containment policy of Soviet communism, Truman supplied U.S. technical and
economic assistance to developing countries. 71 The Shah of Iran regarded the amount of
economic aid he received insubstantial, especially compared to his counterparts in Greece
and Turkey. As such, the Shah relied on Iran’s share of oil profits, which the Iranian
Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara attempted to renegotiate with the British-owned AngloIranian Oil Company (AIOC) in July 1949, to fend off another Soviet incursion and
communist subversion. 72 The fact that Britain continued to be in control of the AIOC,
and the general feeling that the prime minister acquiesced to British interests, contributed
to the rise of nationalism in Iran. The assassination of Razmara by a radical Islamist
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group on March 7, 1951, provided the impetus for the Majlis (Iranian parliament) to
nationalize the AIOC and elect Mohammad Mosaddeq as Prime Minister. 73
As previously discussed, the U.S. became alarmed by Mosaddeq’s increasing
alliance with the Tudeh Party and overtures to the Soviet Union. Consequently, the 1953
sanctioned coup that ousted Mosaddeq from office enabled the Shah to gain tighter
controls over the Iranian government. It also greatly increased U.S. involvement in Iran.
Under the Eisenhower administration, economic aid to Iran increased 665% and military
assistance amplified by 341%. 74 In August of 1954, the new National Iranian Oil
Company signed an agreement with an international consortium of oil producers, which
split oil profits fifty-fifty between the consortium and Iran. 75 The move ended the British
monopoly on Iranian oil, and gave the Shah additional means to stabilize Iran’s economy
and consolidate his power. In 1955, the Shah signed the Baghdad Pact, which firmly
aligned Iran with the West. When Iraq broke with the pact, the Shah used Iraq’s
realignment toward the Soviets to press for even more U.S. security guarantees. At this
juncture in Iranian-Iraqi relations, the Shah made his first approach to Barzani with a
proposal of monetary and arms support in the Kurds’ fight against the Qasim regime. By
doing so, the Shah hoped to diminish Qasim’s ability to act on his renewed claims to the
Shatt al-Arab and on Iran’s oil-rich province of Khuzestan. 76 Throughout the decade, the
Shah’s growing unpopularity caused grave concerns within the Eisenhower
administration for the regime’s stability. Nonetheless, the U.S. continued the flow of aid
to Iran to maintain the West’s influence over the Shah. The succeeding administrations
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of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson sustained the supply of weaponry and
economic assistance, all the while encouraging the Shah towards reform and moderation
efforts. 77
BRITAIN’S DEPARTURE
In 1968, Britain announced it would militarily withdraw from the Gulf region by
1971. Since the nineteenth century, Britain had been the dominate force in the region.
But the Six Day War, and the ensuing Arab oil boycott coupled with the closing of the
Suez Canal, took an enormous economic toll on Britain. 78 It could no longer see a
feasible way to sustain what was left of the empire in the Middle East. The British
Cabinet had debated the move for over a year before making the formal announcement.
The declaration caught the United States off guard. 79 Johnson and his advisors had scant
time to formulate a new Middle Eastern policy given that the U.S. had heavily relied on
Britain’s authority in the region and maintained a position of nonintervention in the
region. In formulating a plan to fill the impending void, and amid growing American
domestic pressure against direct military intervention in Asia and the Middle East, the
Johnson administration favored a proposal discussed in Britain of installing regional
powers to fill their role. 80 Both Iran and Iraq individually hoped to take on the function
of regional power. 81 After careful consideration of the regional dynamics, and possible
repercussions, the new administration of Richard M. Nixon engaged the Shah of Iran in
providing security in the Gulf as part of his Nixon Doctrine (1969), whereby the U.S.
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delivered military and economic aid to U.S. allied countries threatened by a nuclear
power. 82 It is within these regional and global dynamics and conflicts that determined
the fate of the Iraqi Kurdish national movement from 1969 to 1988.
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III.

NIXON’S WHITE HOUSE AND THE SHAH OF IRAN

When Richard M. Nixon took office in 1969, one of his initial tasks involved
reshaping America’s foreign policy. Long weary of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia,
and deeply involved in the civil rights movement on the home front, the American public
paid little attention to the events unfolding in the Middle East. Yet the region remained
crucial to U.S. security in maintaining the flow of oil to the West and in countering
Soviet expansionism. The Twin Pillars Policy, initiated by the Johnson administration in
anticipation of Britain’s withdrawal from the region, devolved U.S. security in the
Persian Gulf to Saudi Arabia and Iran in an attempt to contain the spread of
communism. 83 Recognizing American sentiment on U.S. overinvolvement on the world
stage, Nixon discussed his rapidly evolving foreign policy approach with reporters on
July 25, 1969, in Guam. Initially labeled the Guam Doctrine, but later called the Nixon
Doctrine, his remarks signified the role the U.S. would play in the post-Vietnam future.
Nixon stated, among other key points, the U.S. would honor all its treaty commitments,
and “that as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major
power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a
right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the
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Asian nations themselves.” 84 Although Nixon’s remarks concerned Asia, they quickly
formed the basis of his overall foreign policy, which extended to the Persian Gulf.
Under the Twin Pillars Policy, both Saudi Arabia and Iran stood as the regional
guardians of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. Nixon, preoccupied with Vietnam and
U.S.-Soviet relations, nevertheless aspired to counter Soviet advances in the Middle East
with improved relations with Arab states. Neither Nixon, nor his National Security
Adviser, Henry Kissinger, possessed much understanding of the Middle East, especially
in the diplomatic methods employed in the region. 85 The United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242, unanimously approved on November 22, 1967, which affirmed
the fulfilment of Charter principles requiring the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East, 86 held little importance to either Nixon or Kissinger. In his memoir,
White House Years, Kissinger asserted, “When I entered office I knew little of the Middle
East.” 87 He went on to claim that Nixon felt Middle East diplomacy had no appeal
domestically and possessed limited potential for any type of success. 88 Although Nixon
planned to guide foreign policy from the White House, and wanted a U.S. presence in the
region mainly to thwart further Soviet influence, he desired to distance himself from
directing Middle East policy. As such, Nixon delegated the State Department to manage
the region. 89 With continuous, and increasing, tensions engulfing the Middle East,
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Kissinger took on a much larger role and supplanted the State Department in handling
Middle Eastern affairs.
Nixon and Kissinger resonated intellectually. In choosing Kissinger, Nixon later
expressed in his memoir, “we were very much alike in our general outlook in that we
shared a belief in the importance of isolating and influencing the factors affecting
worldwide balances of power.” 90 Since Nixon wanted a direct hand in guiding foreign
policy, his choice of National Security Advisor was crucial. As chair, Kissinger
revamped the National Security Council (NSC), which then yielded him considerable
power and effectively allowed him to skirt both the State Department and Congress in
foreign policy matters. 91 Even though the Middle East continued under the purview of
the State Department, Kissinger crafted secret channels, “back channels” as he called
them, to foreign governments and U.S. ambassadors. 92 The furtive conduits, approved by
Nixon, characterized the general manner in which Kissinger carried out much of his
foreign policy processes and decision making.
Appreciative of Israel’s position and role of countering communism in the Middle
East, Nixon initially endeavored to employ a more evenhanded approach to the region
with improved U.S.-Arab relations to balance the pro-Israel strategy of his
predecessors. 93 Although Nixon aimed to improve relations with Arab states, he skirted
direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 94 As for Saudi Arabia, the government
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looked with caution to their new role as part of the twin pillars, as they seldom made
public stands on issues pertaining to matters outside of its borders. 95 On the other side of
the Gulf, the Shah of Iran relished his U.S. appointed position of importance. Long wary
of British imperialism in the region, Mohammad Reza feared that Britain’s pull out from
the region would favor an Arab state, such as Iraq, as their replacement, and place Iran at
greater risk to Soviet encroachment. The Shah also desired to reestablish Iran among the
great world powers, a position he felt the country once occupied. 96 America’s move to
position Iran as the other column supporting U.S. regional matters offered reassurance to
Mohammad Reza, and provided the opportunity for him to champion his overarching
agenda. While enjoying diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab state, and Iran,
a Shi’a non-Arab country, held differing worldviews, particularly in modernization,
which made for uneasy cooperation as twin pillars of America’s new Middle Eastern
policy. 97 With progressively intense lobbying by the Shah, the Nixon administration
increasingly relied on Iran to deliver regional stability, along with an orderly, continuous
stream of oil to the United States and its allies. This reliance on Iran to provide security
in the Persian Gulf on behalf of the U.S. emboldened the Shah to assert his claim of
regional dominance, initiate a challenge to Iraq over the Shatt al-ʿArab, and instigate a
proxy war using the Iraqi Kurds as strategic allies.
THE SHAH OF IRAN
The warm association between Richard Nixon and the Shah of Iran began in
1953. While serving as vice president under Eisenhower, the two met for the first time.
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During the encounter, Nixon observed him to be quiet and thoughtful, and later remarked,
“I sensed an inner strength in him, and I felt that in the years ahead he would become a
strong leader.” 98 As president, Nixon found a matured Mohammad Reza with more selfassurance and political astuteness, and a kindred spirit. They both held adamant anticommunist views, professed to be practitioners of realpolitik, and scorned American
liberal intellectuals. 99 The rapport the two shared allowed for greater ease in
implementing Nixon’s doctrine in the Gulf region. Apportioning regional responsibility
to the Shah in curbing communism, the U.S. provided assistance and training to the
Iranian government while interfering little with how they solved their internal communist
problem. 100 Mohammad Reza seized the opportunity afforded by the White House and
amplified his lobbying for additional oil sales to the U.S. in exchange for increased
purchasing of American weapons to defend the Gulf from Soviet incursion. 101 Iran
appeared poised to transform into a regional superpower.
REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ AND THE IRAQI KURDS
In 1968, Iran’s adversary to the west, Iraq, endured yet another regime change
that brought the Baʿthists to power. The previous Iraqi regime of ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿArif
severed ties with the U.S. in 1967 after the Six Day War, although back channels existed
between the United States and Iraq through foreign intermediaries. 102 Shortly after
Nixon took office, Iraq’s new regime, under the Baʿthists leader Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr,
sentenced and hanged sixteen people accused of spying for Israeli. 103 The Iraqi move
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aroused worldwide attention, including an attempted intervention by the U.S. through
oversea emissaries, and a U.S. initiated appeal from the United Nations, but al-Bakr
insisted the matter involved a domestic issue and that foreign entities needed to stay out
of Iraq’s internal affairs. 104 Additionally, in June 1969, the Iraqi regime signed an
agreement with the Soviet Union to develop the Rumaila oilfield, a move that
significantly brought the Soviets into the production of Gulf petroleum, and invited closer
ties between Iraq and the Soviet Union. 105 Increasingly isolated internationally, and
tenuously governing domestically amid their ongoing consolidation of power, the
Baʿthists, nonetheless, maintained a belligerent anti-Western stance and continued the
call for armed struggle against Israel’s occupation of Arab territory. 106 Iraq’s actions
garnered little attention from the White House, which contented itself with the State
Department and Iran dealing with the Iraqi issue.
Al-Bakr’s regime experienced rising trepidation with the growing alliance
between Iran and the U.S., and markedly so when American arm imports increased to
Iran after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine. Although its neighbor to the east
caused major concern, the Kurdish question within Iraq presented just as large a problem.
The Iraqi Kurds’ quest for autonomy posed a major obstacle to the Baʿth’s consolidation
of power, particularly in light of Barzani and his Peshmerga (Kurdish fighting force,
meaning “one who faces death”) 107 proving over the years they could be a major source
of disruption to the various ruling governments in Iraq. After Barzani’s forces attacked
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the oilfields in Kirkuk in March 1969, and disrupted oil flow for a number of days, alBakr’s government looked to defuse Kurdish aims and bring the KDP into the Iraqi body
politic. 108 Long aware of both Iranian and Israeli support to the KDP, and hoping to
counteract the two countries’ influences, al-Bakr dispatched Saddam Hussein, then
second in command, to broker a deal with Barzani to appease the Kurds. 109 Before
Saddam could negotiate a settlement with Barzani, the Shah of Iran publically abrogated
the 1937 treaty over the Shatt al-ʿArab in April 1969.
The Shatt al-ʿArab (River of the Arabs, in Arabic) is formed by the confluence of
the Euphrates and the Tigris in southern Iraq and empties into the Persian Gulf. Its
southern end delineates the boundary between Iran and Iraq. Historically, the use of the
river as a demarcation line presented a number of difficulties mainly due to the use of the
thalweg principle previously mentioned. The signed 1937 treaty recognized the border
between the two countries using both the low water mark on the eastern side of the river
and the thalweg between Abadan and Khorramshahr, approximately a four mile stretch of
the Shatt al-ʿArab. 110 This delineation proved advantageous to Iraq as the treaty gave
control of most of the river to the Iraqis. After arguing successfully of its nearly
landlocked geography, and heavily supported by the British as a former mandate, the
treaty granted Iraq concessions that allowed for the eventuality of Iran paying tolls to Iraq
when Iranian ships used the Shatt al-ʿArab. 111 In addition, stipulations of lowering the
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Iranian flag and requiring an Iraqi pilot on Iranian ships contributed to the escalating
tensions between the two countries after the 1937 treaty signing. 112
Since 1963, four years after Barzani initially reached out to Israel for assistance
against their common foe, Iraq, the Israeli government provided weapons and
ammunition to the KDP in support of their quest for an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. 113
Israel’s motive for helping the Kurds centered on unbalancing the then Iraqi regime, and
not particularly on backing Iraqi Kurdish autonomy. The Israeli government feared
growing Iraqi Arab nationalism, and with Iran’s secret assistance, agreed to send Sovietmade weapons, medical supplies, and communication equipment to the Iraqi Kurds’
nationalist movement, along with a $50,000 monthly stipend, which Iran supplemented
with additional monetary and material support. 114 Both governments agreed to keep the
knowledge of the covert arrangements from their allies. While the Israeli-Iranian backing
allowed Barzani and the KDP to make several significant military strikes and raids
against the Iraqi central governments, the Kurds were unable to turn the joint support into
creditable advancements toward autonomy. The Iraqi Kurds were able, however, to
diffuse Iraq’s strength in the region by preoccupying and subverting the Baʿthist regime’s
internal efforts to consolidate their base of power.
Viewing the Iraqi Baʿthists’ socialist rhetoric and growing relationship with the
Soviets as disturbing, and a potential threat to his sovereignty, the Shah felt emboldened
by the Twin Pillars Policy to assert his regional dominance against al-Bakr’s regime.
With the looming 1971 British withdrawal from the region, the Shah endeavored to prove
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his significance in the Gulf to the U.S. by manufacturing a crisis along the Shatt al-ʿArab
waterway, thereby demonstrating his assumed provincial authority and ability to check
Iraq’s army. The Shah announced Iran would make full use of the Shatt al-ʿArab without
respect to Iraqi territorial rights, established under the 1937 Saadabad Pact, and amassed
troops along various disputed southern border points. 115 He hoped to diminish the
Baʿthist regime’s effectiveness by splitting Iraqi forces between fighting the Kurds in the
north and defending Iraqi territorial rights on the Shatt al-ʿArab. 116 Iraq retaliated against
the move by threatening to use force to defend its claim of the waterway. For its part, the
U.S. State Department continued its hands-off policy towards Iraq and dismissed Iranian
claims of al-Bakr’s regime becoming a communist satellite of the Soviet Union. 117 The
evidence gathered by the State Department indicated that the Baʿth regime, contrary to
Iranian assertions, continued in its internal struggle with the Iraqi Communist Party
(ICP), and in fact, worked to severely limit, if not eliminate, ICP involvement in Iraq’s
central government. 118 As such, the White House deferred to the State Department’s
position and allowed the status quo to stand.
With fighting Barzani’s Peshmerga in the north, and Iran contesting the Shatt alʿArab, al-Bakr and his second in command needed time to secure their base of power. In
order to placate the Kurds and stop the open hostilities, along with countering the Shah’s
support of the KDP, Saddam traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to work out a deal with Barzani.
On March 11, 1970, both camps signed and initiated an agreement that recognized,
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among other items, the Iraqi Kurds’ right to territorial autonomy. 119 As noted by Ofra
Bengio and David McDowall, the declaration marked, for the first time in the twentieth
century, an Iraqi regime recognizing Kurdish rights to territorial autonomy. 120 McDowall
also stated that the accord has endured as “the Kurds’ favoured foundation stone for
future relations with the rest of Iraq.” 121 For the Baʿth regime, the agreement provided
both time for centralizing their control and relief from the armed struggle with the KDP.
In addition to signing the declaration, Barzani broke his ties with Iran. 122 These
combined actions shifted the regional dynamics between Iraq and Iran as the agreement
allowed for the reallocating of Iraqi troops from the provinces in the north to the
contested regions along the Shatt al-ʿArab.
THE 1970 MARCH ACCORD
The March accord angered the Shah of Iran, who had previously sent word to
Baghdad that he would cease supplying the KDP in return for Iraqi concessions in the
Shatt al-ʿArab, which al-Bakr declined. 123 Significantly, the mutual agreement between
the Baʿthist regime and the KDP meant the Shah lost a critical advantage, the Iraqi
Kurds’ belligerence against Baghdad, in his scheme to assert Iran’s regional authority.
The Shah then intensified his appeal to the U.S. for greater support, particularly in
helping “to equip and develop its forces so that minimum necessary deterrent strength
could be developed prior to British pull-out from Gulf end of 1971.” 124 He was
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convinced the Soviets initiated the declaration with the ultimate goal of establishing an
independent Kurdish state, thereby creating a conduit bypassing Iran and Turkey and
permitting easier Soviet access to the Middle East. 125 Over the following two months,
the Shah sent numerous communications to the State Department via direct talks with
various U.S. embassy and military officials, as well as messages sent by him through his
prime minister, making multiple requests for increased resources to defend the Persian
Gulf from Soviet encroachment. 126 At this juncture, the State Department continued the
lead in handling Middle Eastern affairs. Skeptical of the Shah’s warnings, the State
Department declined to take any explicit action, and expressed to Tehran that the
declaration between the Baʿthist regime and the Iraqi Kurds would likely fall apart as the
two camps held a mutual distrust of the other. 127 Although Kissinger received briefings
and reports on the region, and generated memorandums to keep the president briefed on
situations, Persian Gulf issues remained a low priority.
Throughout the remainder of 1970, and during 1971, the relationship between the
Baʿthists and the Iraqi Kurds stayed cautious. In July 1970, the Baʿth rejected the KDP’s
nomination of Habib Karim as Vice President of the Republic because he was of Persian
ancestry. 128 Article twelve of the March accord stipulated that one of the vice presidents
would be a Kurd. 129 The refusal of Karim elicited no negative response from Barzani,
but the move indicated that each side continued to be wary of the other. Another article
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in the agreement called for the “unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a selfgoverning unit.” 130 In order to determine the demarcation of the autonomous region,
Baghdad called for a census to take place in October 1970. 131 The region of Kirkuk, an
oil-rich province, presented a sticking point for both sides. Baghdad feared the census
would prove the area’s population majority Kurdish, thus requiring Kirkuk be turned over
to the Iraqi Kurds. 132 Barzani worried the census would be manipulated by the regime,
either by forging results or by relocating the inhabitants to change the population
statistics. 133 Each side, leery of the other’s motives, maneuvered to present their case.
Barzani attempted to bring in under his control the Turkomans in Kirkuk, whom the
Turkoman leader claimed were threatened with elimination if they did not comply with
Kurdish demands, thereby asserting the Turkoman as Kurdish. 134 Another argument
attempted by Barzani entailed including the Faili Kurds, originally from Luristan, Iran, as
citizens, and therefore counting them in the census as Kurdish. 135 The Baʿth regime, for
their part, reinstituted and propagated an Arabization policy in the Kirkuk region
whereby they evacuated Kurds and settled Arabs. 136

Coupled with a failed assassination

attempt of Barzani’s son, Idris, as well as Barzani himself, the March declaration showed
definitive signs of unraveling.
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BREAKING OF RELATIONS
Iranian-Iraqi relations devolved, on November 30, 1971, Iran seized three islands
in the Strait of Hormuz. 137 One day later, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Iran, as
well as broke off ties to Great Britain. After unsuccessfully attempting to rally other
Arab nations against Iran’s growing power in the Gulf, and Britain’s quiet consent of
Iran’s increasing military build-up, Iraq turned towards rapprochement with the
Soviets. 138 The signing of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, in
April 1972, coupled with the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company two months
later, enabled al-Bakr and Saddam to gain considerable control of the central
government. 139 Whereas the 1970 March accord sought to align the Kurds with the Baʿth
regime, the new treaty forsook the Iraqi Kurds in favor of the ICP, which stood as an
obstacles to the Baʿth’s consolidation of power, too. While Barzani had previously asked
the Soviets to be included in the Soviet-Iraqi pact, the signed agreement left the Kurds
out altogether with only a promise by the Soviet premier that he would take up the matter
with Baghdad. 140 Moscow neglected to make good on their word.
The earlier assassination attempts on Barzani and his son led the KDP leader to
renew his association with both Iran and Israel. As the Soviets had pressured him to
acquiesce to Baghdad, Barzani felt increasingly constrained in his ability to counteract
the Baʿth and to assert for Iraqi Kurdish autonomy. One of the stipulations of the SovietIraqi treaty involved including the Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi communists into the National

137

Bengio, Kurds Iraq, 66.
Gibson, Sold Out? 131.
139
Tripp, History Iraq, 208.
140
Bengio, Kurds Iraq, 67.
138

46

Patriotic Front with the Baʿth in hopes of stabilizing Iraq internally. 141 Now heavily
invested in Iraq, the Soviet Union wanted a calm domestic scene to insure the usefulness
and longevity of their alliance. The Soviets courted Barzani with guarantees of support
for autonomy if the Iraqi Kurds aligned with the Baʿthist regime. Distrusting of the
Soviets, Barzani then sent urgent messages to Washington. The warning to the
administration was intervene with support or the Kurds would be forced to join with the
Iraqi regime. Barzani made several appeals through various indirect channels, such as
via SAVAK (Iran’s Organization of National Security and Information) officials, a KDP
emissary to U.S. Embassy representatives, and a direct request from King Hussein of
Jordan, but his appeals for direct U.S. financial assistance went unheeded. 142
Washington’s preoccupation with final preparations for the upcoming Moscow Summit,
along with recommendations from the NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs) and the
CIA, precluded any changes. 143 The Nixon administration maintained its nonintervention
policy towards the Iraqi Kurds as the U.S. had no strategic interest in their nationalist
movement. Although the Soviet-Iraqi treaty caused concern in the White House, Nixon
remained focused on achieving détente with the Soviet Union and preferred to make no
policy changes that could be construed as anti-Soviet. 144 Nixon chose, instead, to let Iran
and Israel handle the Kurds.
As the Moscow Summit engrossed the White House, Barzani and SAVAK
devised a plan to overthrow the Baʿth regime using an alliance of Iraqi opposition forces
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operating out of Iraqi Kurdistan. 145 The KDP, while receiving funding from Iran and
Israel, remained in negotiations with Baghdad for the full implementation of the 1970
March accord. Barzani felt the unfulfilled articles in the accord, in particular the return
of Kurds to their villages and redress of wrongful Arabization, equated to an all-out
assault on the Iraqi Kurds. 146 Untrusting of Tehran to fulfill its promises, and clearly at
odds with Baghdad, Barzani pinned his hopes on Washington eventually coming through
with support for Kurdish ambitions.
After the success of the Moscow Summit, and no longer feeling the pre-talk
constraints, the U.S. turned its attention towards re-evaluating its policy on Iraq. The
direct Soviet-Iraqi alliance changed the Cold War dynamics in the Gulf region. As well,
it highlighted Barzani’s arguments for the U.S. supporting the Iraqi Kurds. Nixon,
having previous experience dealing with Iraq in the late 1950s as Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s vice president, understood the Cold War significance of the treaty. 147 The
White House did not believe in the validity of the Iraqi Kurd’s struggle, and it harbored
the fear that the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq would spread to its regional allies, Turkey and
Iran. 148 In agreement, the State Department warned that autonomy or independence for
the Iraqi Kurds would prove regionally destabilizing and detrimental in the long term. 149
Kissinger often referred to the Iraqi Kurdish uprising as a ‘Kurdish thing’, but
acknowledged in his concluding memoir, Years of Renewal, that after signing the treaty
with the Soviet Union, “Iraqi forces stepped up their attacks on the Kurds beyond a level
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that could be balanced by covert Iranian and Israeli assistance.” 150 Indeed, not only had
Iraqi aggression towards the Iraqi Kurds intensified, skirmishes between Iraq and Iran
troops escalated along their common border. 151 After Nixon and Kissinger’s scheduled
trip to Tehran in late May 1972, the tides of fortune changed in favor of Barzani and the
KDP.
KISSINGER STEPS IN
While in Iran, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah discussed several key issues
relating to current events, from the Moscow Summit to Iran’s help in South Asia. As
recorded in the official memorandum of conversation, both leaders reiterated their
appreciation of solid U.S.-Iranian relations; Nixon added, “We came to visit Iran because
we considered it symbolic of our strong support for our friends. We would not let down
our friends.” 152 For his part, the Shah stressed the importance of the Middle East to the
West, especially in regards to the flow of oil to the United States and its allies, and the
threat posed by the Soviet-Iraqi treaty to Iran’s security. 153 He also restated his fear that
“the Soviets would establish a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists;
the Kurdish problem instead of being a thorn in the side could become an asset to the
Communists.”154 When asked by Kissinger what the U.S. could do, the Shah replied that
Turkey needed strengthening, and “Iran can help with the Kurds.” 155 Kissinger later
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reported, in his third memoir, that after the meeting with the Shah, Nixon felt the Iraqi
Kurdish rebellion against the Baʿthist regime would fall apart without America’s help. 156
Furthermore, Kissinger remarked that the intent of American sponsorship centered on
penalizing Iraq for “imposing their regime,” and the U.S. contributing to the regional
balance of power. 157 The support would grant the Kurds increased bargaining power
against the Iraqi regime, and bring about some cohesion to the sometimes conflicting
reasons for Iranian and Israeli backing. 158 The Tehran meeting prompted America’s first
direct support of the Iraqi Kurds and their ambitions for self-governance. In redefining
U.S. security in the Persian Gulf, the Nixon administration persisted with the Cold War
mindset of containing Soviet influence in the region. Despite the success of the Moscow
Summit, unresolved issues over conflicts in the Middle East perpetuated tensions
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. By secretly funding the Iraqi Kurds, and
ostensibly their goal of autonomy, the U.S. demonstrated a continued commitment to its
Gulf policy of supporting regional states, principally Iran, in defending American
interests in the region.
Over the course of Nixon’s first two years in office, Kissinger appropriated a
larger role in Middle East policy making. Often circumventing the State Department’s
authority and policies in the region, Kissinger utilized his well-developed network of
back channels to accomplish his agenda. An August 23, 1973, New York Times article,
entitled “Rogers Quits, Kissinger Named,” claimed that Kissinger overshadowed William
P. Rogers, Secretary of State, despite Rogers apparent role as Nixon’s top adviser on
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foreign policy. 159 Kissinger’s political prowess ostensibly overshadowed Rogers’
abilities. A later New York Times article, “William P. Rogers, Who Served as Nixon’s
Secretary of State, Is Dead at 87,” asserted that during Rogers’ tenure as Secretary of
State, Kissinger secretly arranged the details of Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China
(1972), as well as held talks with North Vietnam, all without the knowledge of Rogers. 160
Nixon and Kissinger frequently met several times a day when the National Security
Advisor was in Washington. 161 Consequently, Kissinger possessed greater access to the
President along with more opportunities to argue for the legitimacies of his, Kissinger’s,
proposals. During the May 1972 meeting with the Shah, Kissinger asserted his perceived
position and initiated the inquiry as how best the United States could help. He eventually
persuaded Nixon that a move to support the Iraqi Kurds was in the best interest of the
United States. Kissinger played the pivotal role in the covert financing of the Kurdish
nationalist movement from the onset of U.S. involvement.
U.S. COVERT SUPPORT TO IRAQI KURDS
Against the backdrop of Cold War concerns and the prospect of a secret alliance
between the U.S. and the Iraqi Kurds, the Shah of Iran made a request through Richard
Helms, Director of the CIA, that a meeting be arranged between Kissinger and two KDP
diplomats, Idris Barzani and Mahmoud Uthman. 162 In June 1972, the Kurds presented
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their case directly to key U.S. officials. Although not present, Kissinger authorized
Helms and Colonel Richard Kennedy, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Council Planning, to communicate U.S. sympathy for the Iraqi Kurdish
movement and acknowledge their presence in Helms’ office proved America’s
consideration of their request. 163 After the meeting, Helms sent a proposal, dated July 28,
to the White House advocating for covert support to the Iraqi Kurds. The CIA’s
recommendation, prompted by Kissinger, included two means by which military and
financial assistance could be ordered, either by circumventing the 40 Committee and go
straight by memorandum to the President, or inform the 40 Committee principles,
avoiding any paper, and informing them that the President wants this done. 164 A division
of the Executive branch, the 40 Committee’s mandate specified overseeing proposed
significant covert activity. Nixon directed Kissinger to gain approval without meeting on
the subject. Citing reasons of security, Kissinger asserted that the plan was hand-carried
to the principles with each having the opportunity to object, but none did. 165 Immediately
after the consent of the committee principles, shipments of arms and supplies began,
funneled through Iran to the Iraqi Kurds. Not until August 1, 1972, did Nixon sign off on
the directive, which included $3 million in financial assistance per year and another $2
million for military supplies. 166 For the first time, the United States categorically
intervened on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds’ objectives.

163

Charountaki, Kurds US Foreign Policy, 137.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 19691972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
2006), Document 321, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321 (accessed June
28, 2017).
165
Kissinger, Years Renewal, 584.
166
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 19691972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
164

52

Throughout the remainder of 1972, and well into 1973, skirmishes intensified
between Kurdish and government forces despite on-going negotiations between Barzani
and the Iraqi regime. The proposed geographic boundaries of the Kurdish autonomous
region constituted the main sticking point. 167 The additional covert support from the U.S.
appeared to give the Iraqi Kurds the needed leverage to maintain their ground politically
and geographically. With increasing American support, the KDP felt emboldened to
resist joining the National Patriotic Front and empowered to push for autonomy.
According to a December 1, 1972, air gram from the Interests Section in Baghdad to the
Department of State, Arthur L. Lowrie, Principle Officer, reported that although the
Baʿthist regime realized a degree of stability, the Kurds continued as the only organized
opposition and were in physical control of a considerable portion of territory along the
Iranian border. 168 In a March 29, 1973, memorandum, Kissinger informed Nixon that
Barzani was the strongest he had ever been during the past twelve years of struggle.
Kissinger further stated about Barzani afforded a buffer force against subversive Iraqi
infiltration teams, and occupied a considerable number of Iraqi forces in the north thereby
preventing them from offensive adventures elsewhere. 169 American covert backing
seemed to be working in favor of both the U.S. and the Iraqi Kurds.
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The outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, however, complicated the
relationship between the United States and the Iraqi Kurds. When the Soviet Union
declined to include Iraq in pre-war consultations, Baghdad, detecting a definite slight,
undertook efforts to improve its associations with the West. 170 As U.S.-Iraqi relations
advanced with more Iraqi contracts awarded to U.S. companies, Kissinger, who
subverted the State Department and took on a disproportionately larger role in Middle
Eastern affairs, used his network of back channels to devise a plan to draw Iraq’s
attention away from the 1973 war by escalating the Iranian-Iraqi conflict. 171 The means
by which Kissinger undertook to accomplish the scheme involved having the Shah
instigate further troubles in Kurdistan. 172 While skirmishes continued between Iraqi and
Kurdish forces, Baghdad hoped to fend off a protracted war with the Kurds. In
December 1973, the Baʿthist regime offered a revised autonomy plan to Barzani. 173
During the following three months, Kurdish subversive activity subsided as Barzani and
Saddam worked together to arrive at a mutual accord, but to no avail. On March 11,
1974, Saddam presented the Autonomy Law to the Iraqi Kurds, which included articles
Barzani felt controversial, and gave Barzani two weeks to accept the plan. 174 The main
point of contention continued to revolve around demarcation lines, particularly the oilrich region of Kirkuk. In addition, disagreements over the structure of financial
autonomy, whether the budget for the autonomous region would reside independently or
operate as part of the overall Iraqi budget; the formation and authority of the legislative
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council in the autonomous region; the subjection of regional security to the state; and, the
supervision by the state on the legality of decisions made by the autonomous bodies. 175
After requesting more funding and advanced military weaponry from the U.S., in which
Kissinger spearheaded the White House’s consent to a modest increase, Barzani declined
Baghdad’s autonomy proposal. 176 Emboldened by U.S. and Iranian support, Barzani
pressed forward with his agenda of establishing an autonomous government in the
Kurdistan region.
FIFTH KURDISH WAR
The Iraqi-Kurdish cease-fire while negotiating the Autonomy Law did not last,
and in April 1974, the fifth Kurdish war broke out. 177 America’s objective in supporting
the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement, principally orchestrated by Kissinger, centered
on backing the Shah of Iran as primary U.S. protectorate in the Gulf. In view of the
vacuum left by the December 1971 British withdrawal from the region, the U.S. turned to
the Shah to maintain security and stability in the area. Cold War concerns dominated
when the Soviet Union entered into a treaty with Iraq, Iran’s biggest regional rival. In
support of Iran and in opposition to Soviet encroachment, the United States provided
secret aid to the Iraqi Kurds in an effort to destabilize the Ba’thist regime in Iraq.
Kissinger figured prominently in the covert funding of the nationalist movement that
ultimately proved detrimental to the Kurdish rebellion. Circumventing the State
Department to avoid scrutiny of his plans, Kissinger dealt directly with Helms, at the
CIA, to assure covert support to the Iraqi Kurds, with the overall mission to sustain the
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Shah’s regional position of power. In the interest of U.S.-Iranian relations, Kissinger
prompted the first direct contact between the KDP and the White House, which resulted
in direct financial and military support to the Iraqi Kurds delivered through Iran. While
autonomy negotiations between Baghdad and the KDP continued, Kissinger used his
considerable authority to subvert the State Department’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle
East and to increase U.S. support in favor of the Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist movement. With
the signing of the Algiers Accord and the aftermath that followed, which will be
discussed in the next chapter, the Iraqi Kurds lost all financial support, and ultimately the
1974 rebellion against Iraq. Precipitated by Kissinger’s decision to withdraw aid to the
KDP, the Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist movement disintegrated.
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IV.

THE ALGIERS ACCORD AFTERMATH

Henry Kissinger orchestrated covert support to the Iraqi Kurds in an effort to
further America’s agenda of assuring Iran’s status as a U.S. protectorate in the Persian
Gulf. Iran persisted as a firm ally, but the U.S. risked alienating Tehran if the Shah’s
request to aid the KDP went unmet. By granting assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, Kissinger
all but guaranteed Iran’s position as a key U.S. ally. Cold War concerns also factored
into Kissinger’s calculations. By keeping Iran closely aligned with America, the
likelihood of Tehran tilting towards the Soviet Union remained minimal. Kissinger
secretly supplying the Iraqi Kurds benefited both the U.S. and Iran, while appearing to
support Iraqi Kurdish aims for autonomy.
Kissinger seized every opportunity available to him to secure Iran’s position in
the Gulf, and capitalized on many of his foreign policy successes, such as the Moscow
Summit, the May 1972 Tehran meeting, and Nixon’s official 1972 China visit, which
Kissinger secretly arranged, to further imbed himself in foreign policy making. Those
accomplishments enhanced Kissinger’s status with the president, and after Rogers’
resignation, Nixon appointed Kissinger to the secretary position in September 1973. As
previously mentioned, Rogers often felt obstructed in his duties by the National Security
Advisor. 178 The tension between Rogers and Kissinger had grown increasingly
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acrimonious throughout the first four years of the Nixon administration as the National
Security Advisor leveraged his back channel connections to the Iraqi Kurds, bypassed the
State Department in communications and notifications, and assumed greater authority in
developing and implementing Middle East foreign policy. The covert support to the Iraqi
Kurds exemplified one of Kissinger’s many back channel maneuverings. Another
example of Kissinger’s operational methods entailed embarking on what the press
dubbed “shuttle diplomacy” in which he assisted with negotiations between Middle
Eastern leaders in troop withdraws and other diplomatic details resulting from the 1973
Arab-Israeli War. 179 Cold War concerns and maintaining open channels for the flow of
oil figured prominently in Kissinger’s Middle East policy calculations. Providing aid to
the Iraqi Kurds nicely fit into Kissinger’s strategy of maintaining Tehran as an ally and
keeping Iran’s foe, Iraq, off balance.
FORD ASSUMES PRESIDENCY
Watergate, a political scandal involving the president, precipitated Nixon’s
resignation in August 1974. Gerald R. Ford assumed the presidency and maintained
Henry Kissinger as both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Ford, having
limited experience with foreign affairs before taking over the presidency, and seeking to
maintain the forward momentum already in progress, relied on Kissinger’s expertise to
sustain the then current state of affairs. Against the back drop of the Cold War and rising
oil prices, Ford became the new commander-in-chief, but Kissinger managed foreign
policy.
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In his concluding volume of memoirs, Years of Renewal, Kissinger observed that
not since Harry S. Truman had a president inherited such an array of foreign policy
challenges in his first weeks in office than Ford. 180 During the same period, Congress
exercised increasing oversight, and as time passed, legislated more specific foreign
policies than during Nixon’s time in office. 181 Kissinger’s dual positions, however,
allowed him to continue wielding considerable influence in foreign policy making. He
maintained his firm commitment of covert support to the Iraqi Kurds, and apprised Ford
on a “need to know” basis. 182 Kissinger enjoyed a good working relationship with Ford,
however, he withheld information from the new president that would hamper Kissinger’s
overall agenda in the Persian Gulf, which sought to maintain Iran’s regional supremacy.
The secret plan of supplying Barzani and his Peshmerga conformed to the strategy of
assigning regional countries as proxies in the fight against the Soviets. Although Ford
continued American arms sales to Iran and U.S. covert backing of the Iraqi Kurds, he
took a more cautious stance on new undertakings with the Shah. Ford considered and
weighed arguments made by members of his administration and those in Congress who
leveled criticisms against the Iranian leader before making decisions. 183 As president,
Ford had the final authority, but Kissinger managed to sway policy to affect the outcomes
he hoped to achieve, which involved supplanting direct U.S. military forces in the Gulf
region with regional allies.
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OIL PRICES AND EMBARGO
The continuing rise of oil prices, provided Iran and Iraq with growing revenues,
which they then poured into additional weapon acquisitions.184 Between 1967 and 1973,
U.S. natural gas reserves significantly dropped from a fifteen year supply to that of less
than ten years, which in turn, hastened an increase in oil imports to make up for the
shortfalls. 185 During the same period, American oil well drilling precipitously fell as
environmental legislation severely hampered those operations. 186 To compensate for the
shortages, the U.S. increased oil purchases from countries that also constituted the main
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in
1960. 187 After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, some members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia,
instituted an oil embargo against the U.S. and other Western nations for their support of
Israel. 188 Both Iran and Iraq formed a part of OPEC. One of the outcomes of the
embargo resulted in massive price hikes for petroleum, which negatively impacted the
economies of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. 189 For the U.S., the
embargo also highlighted the importance of oil to national security and the necessity of
maintaining good relations with OPEC countries to assure American access to oil. For
several of the OPEC nations, the rise in oil prices provided an increasing stream of
revenue.
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As part of his shuttle diplomacy, in November 1973, Kissinger met with the Shah
of Iran in Tehran to discuss the state of Middle Eastern affairs and the implications of the
oil embargo. 190 During the meeting, the Shah agreed not to join the embargo, and
additionally offered to mediate with two other OPEC member countries, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, to end the energy crisis. 191 The meeting ensured a continuation of strong ties
between the U.S. and Iran, particularly in light of the negative impact the Watergate
scandal had on America’s prestige worldwide. The rise of oil prices also benefited Iraq,
which spent its revenues on growing its military capabilities. Viewed through the lens of
the Cold War conflict, the increasing strengthen of Iraq’s military led to worrying
regional ramifications that solidified the importance U.S.-Iranian ties.
Although Ford held a guarded view of the Shah, overall U.S.-Iranian relations
remained virtually unaffected by the change in administrations, largely due to Kissinger’s
continued dual governmental roles. The Shah continued to act as both a conduit and
supplier of military weapons to the Iraqi Kurds, mainly financed through oil profits, for
the overall purpose of keeping Iraq off balance and the Soviets at bay. The Shah’s
strategy overlapped with America’s over all Cold War plans in the Gulf region.
According to Kissinger, the United States sought to provide the Kurds with the ability to
continue negotiating with Baghdad for Kurdish recognition, and keep Iraq unbalanced
without irrevocably dividing up the country. 192 Iran’s goal also included wanting Iraqi
concessions concerning the Shatt al-ʿArab, as well as a sustained Iranian presence in Iraqi
Kurdistan by means of Barzani and his Peshmerga. The Shah feared that if Barzani were
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defeated, Tehran would lose leverage over Baghdad. In addition, Tehran feared that the
resulting power vacuum in the Kurdish region might lead to Soviet-backed Iraqi
communists taking over the area, an immediate threat to Iran. 193 As the Iraqi military
made significant advances into Kurdish territory in late summer 1974, holding more
ground than it had at any time since 1961, Iran and Israel pressed the U.S. to supply
heavier artillery to the Iraqi Kurds. 194 Barzani also made separate appeals to the U.S. for
increased assistance. Kissinger agreed that the Peshmerga needed advanced weaponry to
hold their positions and ward off further losses, but concerns over how to pay and deliver
the additional heavy artillery and tanks without revealing U.S. clandestine funding
proved formidable. 195 Already, the United States contributed a little more than $8
million a year in covert Kurdish support. 196
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TO IRAQI KURDS
Originally, the Shah indicated he might dispatch regular troops to assist the Iraqi
Kurds, supplementing existing Iranian auxiliary troops dressed as Kurdish Peshmerga. 197
The Iranians deployed to Iraqi Kurdistan two artillery battalions, several mortar platoons
and air defense batteries, and surface-to-air missile units. 198 But that stratagem,
Kissinger asserted, held additional complications, such as being too open-ended and too
hazardous, which he expressed directly to Ford when briefing the new president on the
Kurdish operation. 199 Instead, Kissinger suggested another proposition, to which Ford
agreed, that entailed arrangements the Secretary of State devised with Israel to provide
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the Iraqi Kurds with $20 million in Soviet weapons captured by the Israelis during the
1973 war. 200 The additional weaponry allowed the Iraqi Kurds to maintain their defenses
and buy more time to resupply for the upcoming winter. As well, the delivery of heavy
weapons benefited the Shah by keeping Barzani and his Peshmerga militarily viable, thus
sidestepping a direct war with Iraq. 201 Kissinger’s plan fulfilled the goals of both the
U.S. and Iran without divulging America’s covert interests in the region.
IRAQ LAUNCHES MAJOR OFFENSIVE
Initially, the Iraqi Kurds achieved a degree of success in the first month of the
war. They employed guerilla tactics to besiege multiple garrisons, and routed supply
lines to 12,000 Iraqi troops positioned at critical defensive locations. 202 In a crucial
move, the KDP captured the town of Rawandiz, an Iraqi army controlled city on a critical
route leading to Iran for the Kurds. 203 Barzani and his Peshmerga appeared to be
succeeding in their war efforts, and claimed to have the backing of the Kurdish
population, as evidenced by tens of thousands of people leaving towns and villages for
liberated Kurdish areas. 204 In late spring, however, Baghdad launched a major offensive,
aided by the Soviets. Unlike any previous onslaught in the past, these new military
assaults involved indiscriminate aerial bombings of Kurdish civilian populations. 205
Having taken advantage of increased oil revenues to purchase more military hardware
from the Soviets, the Iraqi military unleased an attack against the Iraqi Kurds. 206 In
breach of the Geneva Convention, the Iraqi air force also dropped napalm bombs and
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phosphorous chemicals, obtained from the Soviet Union, on Kurdish villages. 207 Along
with the bombing tactics, Iraq instituted an economic blockade in Kurdish areas outside
of Iraqi control, and burned their agriculture fields and destroyed farm machinery. 208 As
well, Baghdad employed terror campaigns against the general Kurdish population and
encouraged Arab families to move into abandoned Kurdish homes and villages. The
Baʿthist regime hoped to break the popularity of Barzani and the KDP, diminish the call
for Kurdish autonomy, and gain support for the Iraqi central government. Although
Barzani and the nationalist movement enjoyed popular support, managing to continue
attracting thousands of Kurdish volunteers from all over Iraq, an increasing number of
Iraqi Kurdish refugees scrambled to the northern border and into Iran. 209 The Peshmerga
lost ground in late summer, but managed to fortify the remaining territory they held and
dug in for the upcoming winter.
The influx of over 100,000 Kurdish refugees into Iran, along with another
400,000 amassed inside Iraq’s northern border, brought about by the Baʿth regime’s
terror operations and the war, caused grave concern for both Barzani and the Shah. 210
The flood of Kurds into the region created a humanitarian crisis that overextended
Barzani’s abilities to manage the situation and strained Iranian resources. 211 As such,
both leaders petitioned the U.S. for increased aid to deal with the disaster. The Iraqi
Kurdish situation looked ominous from a number of viewpoints. Although Iran’s support
to the Iraqi Kurds in the fall of 1974 reached a record level of $75 million a year, Barzani

207

Bengio, Kurds Iraq, 129.
Ibid.
209
Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq 1958, 169.
210
Gibson, Sold Out? 181.
211
Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, Shah, 105.
208

64

needed additional assistance. 212 Kissinger also worried that Iran’s increasing financial
strain, largely due to supporting the Iraqi Kurds, would weaken the Shah’s defenses and
place the country in a more vulnerable position against Iraq. But, the prospect of
revealing the covert activity and asking for additional funding from Congress presented
Kissinger with a greater conundrum. 213 Ford agreed to the Israeli-Kissinger scheme to
provide heavy weapons to the Peshmerga even though Congress increasingly exercised
oversight of the executive branch. The Watergate scandal precipitated a leery attitude
towards the presidency, and Congress reacted with growing review and monitoring of
government agencies and policy implementations. Keeping Kurdish covert support
secret from Congress posed a substantial problem for Kissinger, who expressed that
Congressional approval for added backing would surely be rejected. 214 Nonetheless,
jeopardizing the Iraqi Kurds’ position, and thus Iran, ruled out inaction. As such,
Kissinger worked in a back channel manner to keep Tehran supplied. He also managed
to push through the previous administration’s approved humanitarian aid and the Soviet
weaponry transferred to the Iraqi Kurds, as Congress remained shielded from the
process. 215 Through Kissinger, U.S. Cold War policy in the Middle East continued along
the same track as it had during Nixon’s administration with Iran serving as America’s
Persian Gulf proxy.
DEAL MAKING
While the Shah lobbied the U.S. for continued support to Barzani, he also
explored the possibility of making a deal with the Baʿth regime. When the Shatt al-ʿArab
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dispute turned violent with open skirmishes between Iranian and Iraqi troops in February
1974, Baghdad asked the United Nations to condemn Tehran for its aggressive actions. 216
After further investigations and in response, the UN Security Council issued Resolution
348 (1974) that called for a resumption of talks between the two countries with “a view to
a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues.” 217 Although Tehran persisted with
open hostilities against Baghdad, Iranian and Iraqi diplomats began meetings to work on
resolving outstanding disputes as directed by the council. 218 The Shah remained intent on
moving Iran’s border on the Shatt al-ʿArab to the boundary prior to the 1937 treaty, as
part of his campaign to enhance his dynasty’s image and elevate his stature at home. 219
Furthermore, he distrusted the Baʿth regime’s resolve to arrive at an agreement.
Nonetheless, negotiations slowly continued between the two countries.
Prior to the start of the 1974 Kurdish War, Iraq began cultivating new economic
and political avenues with the West. In April 1974, the Baʿth regime renewed diplomatic
ties with Great Britain, much to the surprise of the U.S. officials in Baghdad. 220 The
regime also opened relations with France and West Germany. 221 Attempting to diminish
the Soviet’s role in Iraq with leaked reports of discord between the two countries,
Baghdad pushed towards rapprochement with pro-Western Arab nations, particularly
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. 222 Although the Soviet Union remained the main
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supplier of arms to Iraq, and persisted in its involvement in Iraqi oil industries, Baghdad
now possessed the financial means to expand beyond the Soviets. 223
In another unexpected move, Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Talib El-Shibib,
signaled to U.S. Ambassador John Scali that the Iraqi regime wanted to enhance U.S.Iraqi relations. 224 The opening signified the first time since 1967 that Iraq, on an official
level, proposed improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. 225 Scali relayed the message to Kissinger,
who then asked the Ambassador to respond to El-Shibib with “Secretary welcomes Iraqi
readiness to continue this dialogue which he feels will be useful to the interests of both
our countries.” 226 Kissinger also expressed interest in inviting El-Shibib to Washington,
but without publicity so as to keep the meeting secret. 227 While the overtures marked a
willingness to improve U.S.-Iraqi relations, Kissinger maintained steadfast support of
Iran and the Iraqi Kurds. In June 1974, Iraq restored relations with the Soviet Union in
order to secure more weaponry in its battle against the KDP, and for border protection
against Iran. 228 Nevertheless, back channel communications between the U.S. and Iraq
persisted. 229 Kissinger acknowledged the value of improving U.S.-Iraqi relations, but the
precarious position of the Iraqi Kurds and the importance of keeping the KDP militarily
viable outweighed the importance of developing deeper relations with the Baʿth regime.
Maintaining the regional strength of Iran, and thus the continuing support to the Iraqi
Kurds, remained Kissinger’s priority.
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Amidst the various back channel discussions—including UN-directed talks
between Iran and Iraq—the Shah began to express some doubt about the Iraqi Kurds’
military capabilities in fighting Iraqi forces. In December 1974, the Shah began
formulating a contingency plan to thwart the possibility of Iran’s artillery, assembled at
various border points, falling into the hands of Iraqi forces if Kurdish held positions
should fall. 230 The Iraqi Kurds faced incredible odds as the fighting continued.
Normally, severe winters blanketed the Zagros Mountains, which would have stymied
combat and given the Peshmerga valuable time to regroup. But, an abnormally warm
weather pattern allowed for the continuation of Iraqi bombing offensives on Kurdish
positions.231 As the war, and support to the Iraqi Kurds, became increasingly costly and
risky for Iran, the Shah considered the possibility making a deal with Iraq over the
boundary of the Shatt al-ʿArab. While in a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State in
Zürich, Switzerland (February 18, 1975), the Shah informed Kissinger of his openness to
consider negotiations with the Baʿth regime. 232 This disclosure to Kissinger revealed the
first direct indication of Iran possibly abandoning the Iraqi Kurds. A month earlier,
Barzani had sent Kissinger a detailed letter outlining his current political and military
situation, and again asked for additional U.S. support. 233 Kissinger, fully aware of
Barzani’s position, reminded the Shah that if Iran forsook the Iraqi Kurds in favor of a
concession on the Shatt al-ʿArab, the resulting collapse of the Iraqi Kurds would
destabilize the entire region. 234 Further, Kissinger warned the Shah against believing any
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assurances the Iraqi regime would give regarding the administration of the Kurdish
region. 235 In addition, Kissinger expressed his concern to the Shah that the Soviets would
perceive Iran’s withdrawal as “symptomatic of the growing weakness of the West,” and
thus increase “adventurism” in the region. 236 At the end of the meeting, the Shah
indicated to Kissinger that he would continue Iran’s support of the Iraqi Kurds. 237
Reflecting in his memoirs, Kissinger considered the discussion hypothetical in nature,
and not a deal already in progress between Iran and Iraq. 238 Nonetheless, in the
appearance of fairness, Kissinger forwarded his impressions of the meeting to President
Ford and Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States.
Kissinger had the Shah’s reassurance of continued Kurdish support, but he
reported to both Ford and Dinitz that the Shah felt the Kurds “have had it.” 239 Even so,
Kissinger replied positively to Barzani’s January letter expressing appreciation for the
KDP leader’s “valiant effort” and indicating Barzani should “send a trusted emissary to
Washington to give the US Government further information about the situation.” 240
Clearly, Kissinger intended to maintain covert support of the Iraqi Kurds and felt he had
dissuaded the Shah from abandoning the Peshmerga. Paramount to Kissinger’s strategy
in the region resided in keeping Iraq “off balance” with fighting the Iranian-backed Iraqi
Kurds, thereby diminishing Soviet influence in the region. The secret support to Barzani,
made through and with additional assistance from Iran, kept Kissinger’s regional plan
viable without having to disclose to the U.S. Congress the covert operation. As Kissinger
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extrapolated, if the Shah gave up support of the Iraqi Kurds in favor of settling with Iraq
over the Shatt al-ʿArab boundary dispute, Congress, already deeply involved in pulling
out of Indochina, would provide neither militarily nor financially support the Iraqi
Kurds. 241 Even Barzani seemed unaware of Iran’s consideration of negotiating with Iraq.
Certainly, Kissinger’s reply to the KDP leader led him to understand that support would
continue for an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region, along with military and financial
assistance in the fighting.
Prior to the Shah attending the March 1975 OPEC meeting in Algiers, Barzani
sent the Iranian leader a message that read, in part, of the Peshmerga’s ability to capture
multiple enemy positions, but with heavy casualties. 242 In the same statement, Barzani
noted, “to hold those positions is impossible for us.” 243 The contents of the letter greatly
added to the Shah’s already expressed doubt about the competency of the Iraqi Kurds.
When the Shah received words of assurance, communicated through an Egyptian adviser
of President Anwar Sadat, that Iraq would reduce their ties with the Soviet Union if Iran
would cease military pressure, the fate of the Iraqi Kurds appeared sealed. 244 In a deal
with the Baʿth regime, the Shah realized his goal of Iranian sovereignty over the eastern
half of the Shatt al-ʿArab. In the same instance, the Iraqi Kurds lost all Iranian support,
and with it, the assistance of the United States. The 1975 Algiers Agreement, the IranianIraqi accord signed on March 6, 1975, effectively ceased all Iranian aid to the Iraqi Kurds
and their nationalist movement.

241

Ibid., 594.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, eds. Monica
Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 275,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d275 (accessed August 11, 2018).
243
FRUS, 1969-76, XXVII, 275.
244
Gibson, Sold Out? 190.
242

70

ALL AID CEASES
Mediated by Houari Boumédiène, President of Algeria, the 1975 Algiers
Agreement between Iran and Iraq settled border disputes in the Shatt al-ʿArab and the
Khuzestan Province. The main provisions handed the Shah control of the eastern side of
the river at the thalweg, thus granting Iran unimpeded access to the Shatt al-ʿArab. In
return, Hussein succeeded in stopping Iran from funding the Iraqi Kurds. Both countries
agreed to work together on border security and favorable relations. 245
The stunning announcement of the accord’s adoption caught Kissinger off guard.
In his memoir, Kissinger related how the Shah’s “actions were brutal and
indefensible.” 246 He further added his displeasure with the Iranian leader’s decision and
deceptive methods. 247 Yet Kissinger admitted the Shah’s pronouncement served Iran’s
security needs, and eliminated the additional financial toll on the country in continued
support to Barzani and his Peshmerga. 248 With the tenuous position of the Iraqi Kurds,
Iran would need to make a direct military assault on Iraq to gain any substantial
ground. 249 That move would precipitate a war between Iran and Iraq, which the Shah did
not want. As previously mentioned, the U.S. would be disinclined to back any such
Iranian military action. And, any overt American involvement would risk revealing the
current U.S. covert activity in the area.
Before holding a joint press conference with Saddam Hussein announcing the
agreement, the Shah sent Barzani a one day notice of Iran’s intent. Delivered through an
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Iranian general, the stipulations presented to the KDP leader included the closure of the
border to all movement; the immediate cessation of all Iranian aid; the allowance of only
small Peshmerga groups to take refuge in Iran; and, specifically directed at Barzani, the
cautionary note to settle with Iraq on whatever conditions he could muster. 250 In
communicating with Kissinger, the Shah framed his position in Cold War terms. After
relating that the Iraqi Kurds would have one week to resolve whether to stay in Iraq or
retreat to Iran, a safe haven, the Shah stressed to the Secretary of State that Iran and Iraq
would work jointly to determine which “Kurds were good and which were bad (read
Communist).” 251 The message intended to reassure Kissinger that the region would
remain free of communist influences.
Despite giving assurances that Barzani and his Peshmerga had until March 20,
1975, to accept refuge in Iran or face the consequences of staying in Iraq, the Baʿth
regime initiated a full scale assault on the Iraqi Kurds the day after the joint
announcement. 252 In desperation, Barzani sent Kissinger a letter, on March 10,
beseeching him to intervene in the onslaught by using his personal influence with the
Shah to help the Iraqi Kurds. 253 Further, Barzani wrote, “Our movement and people are
being destroyed in an unbelievable way with silence from everyone. We feel Your
Excellency that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our
people who have committed themselves to your country’s policy.” 254 Truly, the United
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States, through Kissinger, had invested a considerable amount of money and effort to
covertly support the Iraqi Kurds in destabilizing the Baʿth regime, and consequently
thwart Soviet intentions in the region. But, Kissinger saw U.S.-Iranian relations as the
primary concern. The Shah remained America’s staunchest ally in the Persian Gulf. If
the U.S. pushed back on the Shah’s decision, with no American guarantee of support, the
U.S. risked alienating a key ally. And, the U.S. could not overtly fund the Iraqi Kurds
without Iran’s support. Since the Shah had ultimately made the decision, Kissinger
reasoned the U.S. had little choice but to consent to Iran’s resolve. 255 As such, Kissinger
let slide a response to Barzani’s urgent plea for help.
The signing of the 1975 Algiers Accord abruptly stopped all aid to Barzani and
his Peshmerga, and the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement, as Iran no longer had a need
to support the rebellion. Covert funding from the United States halted, as well, with the
exception of the March allocation. 256 Without the financial and military provisions, and
the advanced weaponry needed to fight the Iraqi forces, the Iraqi Kurds were soundly
defeated. On March 21, Barzani finally issued an end to all Iraqi Kurdish resistance. 257
Less than a week later, Barzani and his family went into exile. 258 By the end of the
cease-fire on April 1, over 100,000 Iraqi Kurds had crossed over into Iran. Of those Iraqi
Kurds who accepted the Baʿth regime’s terms and stayed in Iraq, their plight consisted of
suffering authoritarian rule in Kurdistan 259, or resettlement to southern Iraq. 260 Through
it all, Kissinger remained steadfast in his Cold War strategy and committed to a healthy

255

Kissinger, Years Renewal, 595.
Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, Shah, 118.
257
Ibid.
258
Ibid.
259
Gibson, Sold Out? 195.
260
Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, Shah, 119.
256

73

U.S.-Iranian relationship despite the devastation suffered by the Iraqi Kurds and to their
nationalist movement.
In 1976, the village VOICE published an article, entitled “A 24-Page Special
Supplement: The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read. The Pike Papers:
An Introduction by Aaron Latham,” describing the findings of the 1975 Pike Committee,
headed by U.S. Representative Otis G. Pike. The leaked report, never official released,
stated the intent of U.S. covert funding to Barzani and the KDP amounted to keeping Iraq
off balance, and not in supporting the Kurdish nationalist movement. The special
supplement went further to assert the Pike Committee claimed that Ford, Kissinger and
the Shah hoped the Iraqi Kurds “would not prevail,” but instead “sap the resources of our
ally’s neighboring country [Iraq].” 261 The U.S. and Iran failed to disclose the real
objective behind their policy towards the Iraqi Kurds, and as such, Barzani fought with
the notion that he and the Kurdish nationalist movement had full American support. 262
Latham claimed that “even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical
enterprise.” 263 A quote attributed to Kissinger, “Covert action should not be confused
with missionary work,” summed up the entire Iraqi Kurdish enterprise. 264
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V.

AMERICA ABANDONS THE IRAQI KURDS

As detailed in the previous chapter, the lead up to and the abrupt 1975 termination
of U.S. and Iranian support, and the plight of Barzani and his Peshmerga’s resistance,
appeared to collapse the Kurdish nationalist movement. This chapter further details
America’s abandonment of the Iraqi Kurds and their quest for autonomy after the 1975
Algiers Agreement, the dramatic transfer of power in Iran, and the shifting of alliances in
the Persian Gulf. Faced with yet more troubles and devastation, an examination of
changing U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf and the impact of those transformations on the
Kurdish nationalist movement will ensue.
Saddam Hussein, whose power and prestige within the Baʿth regime had steadily
increased, now had the military and political means to deal with the Iraqi Kurds on his
terms. No longer seen as posing a threat to national unity, Saddam implemented a series
of policies and programs aimed at eliminating any Kurdish resistance. Systematically,
the Iraqi regime began destroying whole villages, which totaled some 1,400 communities
by 1978. 265 The regime also deported upwards to 600,000 Iraqi Kurds to resettlement
camps located around major towns, all of which allowed for easy access by the Iraqi
military. 266 Those newly constructed camps, surrounded by barb wire, included large
avenues to allow for easy access by the Iraqi military in the event an uprising needed put
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down. 267 Kurdish families of active Barzani supporters, or refugees that returned after
the period of amnesty, found themselves exiled to southern Iraq. 268 Immediate execution
awaited any Iraqi Kurd found returning to their ancestral lands. 269 The relocations to the
southern regions of Iraq hit Iraqi Kurds particularly hard as the environment, both
climatically and socially, posed a dramatic change from the environs of their
homelands. 270 Saddam’s policies intended to divide and conquer the Kurdish nationalist
movement, and to assimilate the Iraqi Kurds into Arab culture. 271 Programs existed
within the resettlement areas to re-educate Kurds on national unity and the virtues of the
Iraqi Baʿth doctrine. 272 At the same time, the Baʿth regime encouraged and supported
Arab Iraqis to settle in formerly predominate Kurdish villages and towns, and awarded
money to Arab men who took Kurdish wives. 273 Of those remaining Iraqi Kurds in the
north, some received large cash payments, which amounted to a form of bribery to
support the government. 274 The regime’s anticipated outcomes, the elimination of the
Kurdish nationalist movement and the integration of Iraqi Kurds into Arab society, led to
multiple clashes between Iraqi Kurds and military forces brought about by the forced
displacements and the imposed indoctrination programs. 275 While many Iraqi
government policies accomplished the suppression of a cohesive Kurdish opposition,
dissension remained among pockets of Iraqi Kurds.
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With Barzani in exile, and the KDP in disarray, the Kurdish nationalist movement
seemed all but forgotten. The Shah of Iran held fast to the 1975 Algiers Agreement and
allowed no concessions to the Iraqi Kurds. In the interest of maintaining a firm Cold War
alliance with Iran, and in favor of U.S. corporations doing business with Iraq, the United
States also declined any type of assistance to the Kurds in Iraq. Moreover, no offers of
government support, nor relief efforts, came from individual countries or the international
community. 276 As noted in a May 1, 1975, United States Central Intelligence Agency
document, produced in coordination with the State Department, the King of Jordan,
Hussein bin Talal, expressed grave concern over the accord and the plight of the Kurds.
In the overview, the King hoped a settlement between Iraq and Barzani might be reached
to allow for the KDP leader to remain head of the Kurdish community. 277 But beyond
Jordan’s voiced concerns, no efforts were exerted on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds at large.
The lack of constraints imposed on Iraq by neighboring countries or the international
community allowed the regime to act with impunity.
IRAQ
In fact, the 1975 settlement of the thalweg line had averted a full scale Iran-Iraq
war, and brought about improved relations among all the Gulf neighbors. The Iraqi
Kurds no longer posed an internal threat to the Baʿthist regime by fomenting instability.
And, Iran lost any leverage over Iraq with the signing of the accord, which led to
improved Iranian-Iraqi relations as the Shah strictly adhered to the agreement. As such,

276

McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 340.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, eds. Monica
Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 286,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d286 (accessed September 22, 2018).
277

77

Iraq turned its focus to domestic economic growth and building up its military power. 278
Recognizing its regional strength depended on lessening Iraq’s dependence on the Soviet
Union, the Baʿth regime endeavored to project a more nonaligned position. 279 In truth,
Saddam coveted the role of leader of nonaligned countries. 280 He saw Iraq’s future, and
by extension his role, as the new regional head of the Arab nation. Subsequently, Iraq’s
diminishing reliance on the Soviet Union paved the way for greater opportunities with the
West. Indeed, Iraqi relations with the West improved, particularly with France.
Although diplomatic ties with the U.S. remained nonexistent, U.S.-Iraqi economic
relations burgeoned. 281 To that point, the West’s increased demand for Iraqi oil, due to
the global oil crisis of 1973-1974, greatly benefitted the Iraqi regime and opened
previously unavailable pathways to Western technologies. 282 While Iraq invested heavily
in its military apparatus, the regime also put money into industry, infrastructure, schools,
clinics, and hospitals. 283 The Iraqi regime moved to better situate itself in the Gulf region
after the 1975 accord. Internally, Saddam positioned himself as the de facto leader of
Iraq. As Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr’s health deteriorated and he withdrew from active
politics, Saddam’s authority increased exponentially. In July 1979, Saddam formally
assumed the presidency. 284 Iraq, now under Saddam Hussein, proved a formidable rival
for the leadership of the Arab world.
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TROUBLES FOR THE SHAH OF IRAN
After 1975, not only did the Iraqi Kurds face harsh conditions, the Shah of Iran
faced an increasingly hostile Iranian populace. In 1963, the Shah had launched the White
Revolution, a series of social, political, and economic reforms, which he anticipated
would elevate the country economically while maintaining a semblance of traditional
governance. 285 During the following decade, his programs initially succeeded in bringing
about many of the anticipated outcomes. Oil revenues helped feed Iran’s economic
growth, however, infrastructural and industrial developments produced the bulk of the
expansion. 286 The Shah’s land reform, which disenfranchised many large landholders,
turned countless sharecroppers into yeoman farmers. 287 While the Shah claimed
continuing success of his White Revolution, he became progressively isolated from the
social and political unrest caused by his restructurings.
Among the critics of the Shah’s White Revolution, the Shi’a clergy proved the
most vocal. Along with the proposed disenfranchisement of landlords, the ulama
(Islamic scholars), many of whom were also landowners, would become marginalized by
expanding bureaucracy. The land reform threatened to diminish their power, particularly
in rural areas where the mullahs served as village mediators in political and social
matters, and if a need arose, offered financial assistance to destitute villagers. 288 A
leading voice of criticism quickly emerged from among the upper clergy, that of
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In 1963, after the new policy announcement, Ayatollah
Khomeini gave a speech admonishing the Shah for conceding Islam and Iranian
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sovereignty to the West. 289 He also derided the Shah for granting rights to women. 290
The 1963 address, in which he called the Shah “you wretched, miserable man,” and the
ensuing anti-Shah protests in Qom, landed the ayatollah in exile for the next fourteen
years. 291 Qom housed the center for Shi’ite religious study in Iran. 292 The Shah’s
mounting dependence on the United States, his growing cult of personality, and the
purposeful sidelining of the clergy inextricably pitted the ayatollah against the
government. In the ten years following the institution of reforms, Iran transitioned into a
state heavily supported by petrodollars and the West, deeply submerged in bureaucracy,
and led by an increasing isolated autocrat.
Several scholars noted that the Shah’s domestic agenda steered the country
towards rebellion as his policies managed to disenfranchise the landed aristocracy, the
ulama, and bazaar merchants. 293 Replaced by technocrats uninterested in personal
networks, many small rural farmers and villagers moved to larger urban areas where they
found growing urban blight, housing shortages, and rising unemployment. 294 Many
younger, educated members of the newly made middle class felt betrayed by the Shah’s
regime, as promised jobs in the public sector failed to materialize. 295 The SAVAK, the
Shah’s secret police, dealt severely with dissidents, and in general, harassed common
Iranians who spoke out against the government. 296 Also perceived as complicit with the
Iranian state stood the United States. The Western-style secular democracy urged by the
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U.S. contrasted with the mounting anti-imperialism sentiment felt by many. Increasing,
larger numbers of Iranians viewed the Shah as a pawn of the United States. 297 Iran’s
domestic situation stood in stark contrast to the Shah’s grandiose self-perception as
Shahanshah (king of kings).
JIMMY CARTER
U.S.-Iranian relations peaked during Kissinger’s tenure. When Jimmy Carter
took office in 1977, the 39th president interjected human rights as a central component of
America’s foreign policy. Although the Shah had enjoyed friendly relations with the
U.S. despite the political affiliation of the incumbent president, the new Carter
administration posed a quandary largely due to the emphasis on improving human rights
around the world. 298 Past administrations overlooked charges of human rights violations
in Iran, but Carter seized the opportunity of his presidency to call upon the Shah to make
meaningful reforms. 299 As one of America’s key allies in the Middle East, Carter pressed
the Shah towards improvements, but declined to make military sales conditional upon
Iranian human rights advancements. 300 Unlike the relationship enjoyed by the Nixon
administration and the Iranian leader, Carter and the Shah experienced an uneasy, and at
times tenuous, association. The Shah’s visit to the U.S. in November 1977, and Carter’s
trip to Tehran a month later, intended to show U.S. support for the Iranian government,
instead helped fuel domestic unrest in Iran. 301 In addition to the Shah’s growing
autocracy and his founding of the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) party, which formed a one
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party system, the cumulative influence of the West on Iran intensified tensions within the
country. 302 Iran sat on the verge of political explosion.
These historical forces led to the Iranian Revolution, a series of events between
1978-1979 that toppled the Shah of Iran and his government in December 1978. 303 The
new Islamic Republic, eventually led by Khomeini, rejected Western imperialism in
favor of an anti-Western theocracy. 304 In the opinion of many Iranians, they equated the
United States as equal an enemy as the Shah.

Initially, the United States prevaricated on

how best to respond to the open hostilities and rebellion against the Shah prior to his
ouster. Caught between his human rights stance and the understanding that armed forces
might be required to put down the revolution, Carter is accused of equivocating as he
understood the vital role Iran played in protecting America’s access to Persian Gulf oil
and containing Soviet encroachment in the region. 305 Equally divided, Carter’s
administration counseled the president with opposing views on the course of action the
Shah should take. 306 In the lead-up to the Shah’s departure from Iran, Carter neglected to
call the Shah directly. 307 His indecision to personally advise the Iranian leader reflected
the administration’s dueling Iranian policy between human rights reformers and military
hawks. 308 Although the administration’s foreign policy agenda with its emphasis on
human rights contributed less to the Iranian Revolution than the Shah’s own policies,
Carter’s vacillation added to the Shah’s own uncertainties. Those insecurities led to the
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Shah to take both a military stance and a conciliatory position. 309 In the end, neither the
Shah nor the U.S. could stop the forces of anti-Pahlavian rule and anti-Western
sentiment.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
November 4, 1979, proved the effective date of severed relations between the
U.S. and Iran. 310 After the collapse of Iran’s secular provisional government, and
preceding the referendum vote on the new Islamic Republic constitution with Khomeini
as its leader, Iranian students took to the streets in protest and seized sixty-three
Americans as hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran. 311 Anger over Carter’s decision
to allow the deposed Shah to enter the U.S. for medical treatment precipitated the
capturing of the U.S. embassy. 312 In response, Carter froze Iranian assets in U.S. banks,
expelled both Iranian diplomats and students from America, initiated international
financial sanctions against Iran along with obtaining a censure from the International
Court of Justice, and finally, cut diplomatic ties with the new Iranian regime. 313 The
release of American hostages occurred later on January 20, 1981. 314 The warm
association between the United States and Iran, initially based on Cold War concerns and
easy U.S. access to Middle Eastern oil, evaporated into a decidedly adversarial
relationship.
The signing of the Algiers Agreement contributed to a series of events that
ultimately toppled the Shah of Iran, placed Khomeini in control of the country, and
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severed U.S.-Iranian relations. Beginning with the Shah’s loss of confidence in the Iraqi
Kurds’ fighting ability against the Baʿth regime, and emboldened by the ostensibly
unconditional support of the United States, the Shah negotiated a boundary settlement
with Saddam. With the Iraqi Kurds then firmly under the control of Iraq and posing no
real threat to the Iraqi regime, Iranian-Iraqi relations warmed considerably. The tentative
alliance allowed for the opening of previously closed borders and the resumption of
Iranian pilgrimages to Karbala and Najaf, Iraq. 315 Both cities play significant religious
roles in Shi’a Islam. Khomeini’s growing prominence and ability to communicate more
readily with his Iranian followers, who visited the exiled ayatollah in Iraq while on
pilgrimage and transported his messages back to Iran via cassette tapes, threatened the
Shah. The opening with Baghdad after 1975 provided the Shah with an opportunity to
ask Saddam to remove Khomeini from Iraq, thus relieving Tehran of the perceived threat
from the cleric. In actuality, Iraq’s deportation of Khomeini to Paris in 1978 opened a
larger, more readily available avenue for revolutionary thought to reach Iranians already
fomenting dissent against the Shah. 316 The Shah of Iran’s expectations, beginning with
his reassessment of Iraqi Kurds’ capabilities in December 1974, and their subsequent
impact, eventually led to his deposition.
THE CARTER DOCTRINE
Although Carter lost his bid for re-election, the Carter Doctrine he initiated in
January 1980, stating the vital importance of the Persian Gulf to U.S. interests and any
attempt by an outside force to gain control of the region would be met with military
action, if needed, provided the framework for the incoming administration of Ronald W.
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Reagan. 317 The Carter Doctrine also disclosed U.S. concerns that the revolutionary
atmosphere, actively propagated by Iranian leaders, would spread to other Middle Eastern
states with large Shi’a populations, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. 318
Carter’s change in foreign policy emphasis, nonetheless, exhibited Cold War concerns.
His doctrine revealed U.S. fears that the anti-American sentiment in Iran could lead that
country to closer ties with the Soviet Union. More importantly, the Soviet’s 1979
invasion of Afghanistan greatly added to U.S. concerns that Moscow might have further
designs to control oil assets in the Middle East. 319 Carter’s unsuccessful diplomacy
efforts in Iran, which included eschewing direct contact with Khomeini, and the Soviet
Union’s move in Afghanistan, led him to take a more traditional Cold War stance that
included attempts at a military build-up in the Gulf region, increased covert activity in
Iran, and an overall increase in defense spending. 320 Foregoing his former human rights
emphasis in foreign policy, Carter reverted to a Cold War stance that placed Soviet
containment as a top U.S. priority.
SADDAM TAKES CHARGE
After the signing of the Camp David Accords, dynamics in the Middle East
changed further when Saddam Hussein assumed a more active political role in the region.
When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 agreement, the Arab League,
formed in 1945 to champion Arab states interests, expelled Egypt from its ranks. 321 With
Egypt no longer the head of the Arab League, Saddam made moves to claim a leadership
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role in the Arab world. 322 He also worked diligently to solidify his position within Iraq.
During the same period, the Iraqi regime began distancing itself from the Soviet Union,
as evident by al-Bakr’s anniversary speech on July 17, 1978, in which no mention of the
Soviet Union or the Soviet Friendship Treaty occurred. 323 After Saddam became
president and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Carter’s administration cautiously
reached out to the new Iraqi head of state with overtures for more, open relations, all in
an attempt to counter possible Soviet moves in the region. 324 Nevertheless, U.S.-Iraqi
relations remained negligible as Saddam focused on consolidating his power, particularly
in the Kurdish areas and among the Shi’a, and solidifying Iraq as the pivotal Arab
state. 325 Although Iraq benefitted from good trading relations with the West, Saddam
saw no benefit in improved U.S.-Iraqi relations. In fact, Saddam positioned himself as
the principal leader of anti-imperialism in the region, and as such, he shunned any signs
of weakness by avoiding alignment with either of the two super powers. Saddam felt
secure in his regional military standing and growing international presence.
With Khomeini’s vocal call for the spread of the Islamic revolution into Iraq,
Saddam redoubled his efforts to champion secular Arab nationalism in the Middle
East. 326 The animosity between the two leaders not only stemmed from their opposing
ideologies, but from the animus Khomeini felt for Saddam after being expelled from Iraq
in 1978. 327 Sensing a possible risk to his regime, and suspecting the splintering Iranian
military indicated a weakness in Khomeini’s leadership, Saddam challenged the 1975
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Shatt al-ʿArab agreement. 328 His move signaled Iraq’s intent to reclaim and fortify the
territory lost to Iran, and shore up the country’s status in the Gulf. 329 A week after
Saddam officially abrogated the 1975 agreement, in September 1980, Iraqi forces
crossed over into Iranian. 330 The Iran-Iraq War began in earnest.
IRAQI KURDS SPLINTER
While Saddam flexed his military might against Iran, the now fractured Iraqi
Kurds continued their hit-and-run tactics against the regime; however, the two major
factions spent as much energy fighting each other for control of the overall Kurdish
nationalist movement as they did Saddam’s government. 331 After the death of Mullah
Mustafa Barzani in 1979, his two sons, Idris and Masoud, took command of the KDP. 332
A former lieutenant of the elder Barzani, Jalal Talabani, disgruntled with the direction of
the movement, broke from the KDP and formed the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK). 333 Talabani’s umbrella organization challenged the KDP for what he saw as “the
inability of the feudalist, tribalist, bourgeois rightist and capitulationist Kurdish
leadership” to assert autonomy for Iraqi Kurds. 334 The intense conflict between the rivals
would last until May 1987 when the two groups joined other smaller Kurdish militant
groups, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Assyrian Democratic Movement, an ethnic
political party in Iraq, to form a Kurdistan Front. 335 As previously discussed, within Iraq,
the Kurds themselves experienced major turmoil, characterized by resettlement,
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Arabization in many sectors of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the bitter fighting between the KDP
and the PUK for control of the nationalist movement. The Kurdistan region churned with
upheaval and open rebellion as the Kurds fought each other, and continued their on-going
battle with the Iraqi regime.
Although ideologically divided, the two major Kurdish nationalist camps caused
additional trouble for Saddam as each claimed to represent the movement. Talabani’s
faction, more left-leaning, democratic, and possessing a socialist political philosophy,
stood in contrast to the KDP, who tended towards the traditional and conservative, and
ascribing to a tribal political philosophy. 336 Saddam now faced negotiating with both
competing factions over the governance of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, the KDP
and the PUK fought against the Iraqi regime, and on occasion, the KDP along with Iran
against the Iraqi regime. 337 The level of Iranian assistance to the KDP in no way reached
that of the Shah’s Kurdish policy. 338 While minimal aid passed from Iran to Iraqi Kurds,
Saddam supported the Iranian Kurdish opposition against Khomeini. 339 Both Iran and
Iraq employed the Kurds in order to gain an upper hand in the war, but both regimes
neglected to support an autonomous region. The United States, for its part, maintained a
non-committal attitude towards Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and refrained from offering any
financial or military support as it had during the Shah’s reign.
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RONALD REAGAN AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
U.S.-Iranian relations changed little when Ronald Reagan won the 1980
presidential election. Taking office one minute before the release of the American
hostages in Iran, Reagan enjoyed the successful freeing of the embassy officials Carter
had worked so diligently to achieve. Despite the release, Iran remained a hostile nation
as Khomeini continued to espouse anti-American rhetoric and labeled the U.S. as “the
Great Satan.” 340 The dual threats of spreading Islamic fundamentalism and Cold War
concerns of Soviet encroachment, however, led the new administration to tilt towards
Saddam’s regime to counter those perceived menaces. As previously mentioned, the
grave concern of Islamic radicalism spreading outward from Iran into neighboring states
occupied much attention in forming America’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, the U.S.
officially maintained a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). 341 With
Soviet-Iraqi relations at a low point, and American companies increasing business with
Iraq, Baghdad seemed the logical regime to support in the Persian Gulf. The Soviets had
pledged neutrality at the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, and went so far as turning back two
ships loaded with arms originally destined for Iraq. 342 Saddam viewed the Soviets’
stance as unacceptable. 343 As such, Reagan assessed the situation as advantageous to
America’s interest and focused his administration on building U.S.-Iraqi relations to
thwart Iranian ambitions and counter Soviet expansion in the region.
At the heart of America’s interest in the Middle East lay easy accessibility to oil.
As part of Saddam’s calculations in launching a war with Iran, he sought to gain control
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of Iran’s Khuzestan Province, a major oil producing region. 344 Aside from the prestige a
conquest would earn him in the Arab world, the oil seized from the capture would greatly
enhance Saddam’s reserves and revenue. 345 Initially making advances into Iranian
territory, Saddam appeared to have the upper hand in the war. 346 But in 1982, Iran made
huge gains with an effective counteroffensive that pushed Iraqi forces back across the
border and into Iraq. 347 In June 1982, Saddam called for a cease-fire and offered an Iraqi
withdrawal to the established international borders. 348 Khomeini rejected the proposition,
and in the following years, the war widened. One of the main targets of both countries
included targeting each other’s oil facilities and oil tankers in the hopes of disrupting, and
cutting off, oil revenues necessary to fund their war efforts. 349 As the war spilled over
into the Persian Gulf, and America’s access to Gulf oil at stake, the U.S. began sharing
intelligence satellite imagery with Iraq to assist with Iraqi defensive moves against
Iran. 350 The dual threat of Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism extending into Iraq, and more
importantly, possible limitations on Western oil supplies, moved the Reagan
administration to tangibly act in Iraq’s favor.
REAGAN REMOVES IRAQ FROM TERRORISM LIST
While acknowledging the ruthlessness of Saddam and his regime, Iran’s 1982 war
gains caused the White House greater apprehension. The threat of spreading Islamic
fundamentalism outweighed U.S. unease over Saddam’s tactics and support of dissent
groups, separatist organizations, and the Abu Nidal organization, a splinter group from
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the Palestine Liberation Organization. 351 Consequently, the Reagan administration took
concrete steps to assist Saddam by removing Iraq from the United States’ State Sponsors
of Terrorism list on February 26, 1982. 352 By doing so, the move allowed for the
offering of U.S. export credits and the loosening of export controls. 353 Now off the
terrorist list, the available U.S. Agriculture Department Commodity Credit guarantees
provided a mechanism for Saddam to purchase much needed food supplies, which prior
cash strapped Iraq lacked the ability to obtain. 354 The guarantees enabled Iraq to make
purchases of badly needed grain and other agricultural commodities to support its
struggling domestic population. Full diplomatic relations with Iraq occurred two years
later, but the path forward started with Iran’s 1982 war advantage and America’s fear of
Islamic fundamentalism spreading into Iraq.
OPERATION STAUNCH AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
Concurrent to surreptitiously supporting Saddam in the Iran-Iraq War, the Reagan
administration initiated a plan, Operation Staunch, to stem the flow of arm sales by
American allies to Iran. 355 Paradoxically, from 1985 to1986, the Reagan administration
clandestinely sold weapons to Iran in exchange for U.S. hostages taken in Lebanon by
radical Islamic groups supported by Khomeini. 356 The White House diverted profits
from those sales to fund the Nicaraguan Contras, the American-backed
counterrevolutionaries fighting the Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front)
regime, led by Daniel Ortega. 357 After exposure, the arrangement became known as the
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Iran-Contra Affair. 358 Later, the White House maintained the main purpose of the
weapons sales were intended to ease U.S.-Iranian relations. 359 Even though the scheme
appeared to influence the release of the hostages, it precipitated more hostage taking in
the Middle East. 360 And, U.S.-Iranian relations remained as they had prior to the
hostages’ release. The opposing White House agendas demonstrated the administration’s
inability to effectively develop a cohesive Middle East plan nor exercise diplomatic
efforts to effect or direct events in favor of American aims in the region. The Iran-Iraq
War raged on in a battle of attrition.
U.S. ASSESSES IRAQI KURDS’ THREAT LEVEL
At no time since the 1975 cessation of aid to Barzani and the KDP did the U.S.
give any official consideration to the Iraqi Kurds’ plight. Even though the Kurdish
nationalist movement, now fractured into several splinter groups and led by one of the
two main camps, the KDP or the PUK, persisted with continuous and multiple skirmishes
against Iraqi forces along the Kurdistan borders, the United States deemed the nationalist
movement inconsequential to U.S. aims in the region. The CIA kept track of the Iraqi
Kurdish dissidents’ activities, but determined they posed no actual danger to Saddam’s
regime. 361 A CIA assessment report, issued December 23, 1983, clearly outlined the
agency’s perception that the Iraqi Kurds lacked the ability to form a common front
against Saddam, as their animosity towards each other precluded any ability to coordinate
a real threat to the Iraqi regime. 362 The assessment also commented that both Kurdish
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camps maintained minimal contact with the Soviet Union, so the possibility of Soviet
involvement in favor of the Iraqi Kurds remained negligible. 363 As America’s primary
concern in the region remained the security of the Persian Gulf and the maintaining of
international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. gave little weight to the
Iraqi Kurds’ battles with Iraq. 364 The focus of America’s Gulf policy centered on
supporting Iraq as the least objectionable belligerent, and the country that would award
more favorable outcomes for the United States at the end of the war.
U.S. RESTORES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ
In November 1984, the United States restored diplomatic relations with Iraq. 365
The reinstatement allowed for more intelligence sharing and an increase in the issuance
of U.S. dual-use technology (technologies used for civilian purposes but also possessing
military applications) licenses. 366 Since 1974, Iraq had acquired weapons and chemical
weapon technology and components from Western nations, primarily France, Germany,
and Italy, with the full knowledge of the White House. 367 Although the official U.S.
position on the Iran-Iraq War remained one of neutrality, the Reagan administration
undertook a more determined position with economic and military aid to Iraq after the
restoration of official diplomacy.
As early as 1974, it was intimated that the Iraqi regime employed chemical
warfare against its Kurdish population. 368 In a December 19, 1983, status report on
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National Security Decision Directive 114, which outlined U.S. policy toward the IranIraq War, to Robert C. McFarlane, the National Security Advisor, implicated Iraq on the
use of chemical weapons against Iran. 369 More, substantiated reports surfaced in
early1984, issued by the United Nations Security Council, that Saddam revived the use of
chemical agents. 370 The targeted areas of chemical weapons use occurred along the
border regions between Iraq and Iran. As early as 1983, the CIA reported, Iraq dropped
chemical bombs in the Hajj Umran and Mount Kordeman region and areas in the Penjwin
district, locales heavily populated by Kurds. 371 Saddam, in direct violation of the 1925
Geneva Protocol Banning the Use of Chemical Weapons in War, which Iraq signed in
1931, denied the use of chemical warfare. 372 The White House protested Saddam’s use
of chemicals, and led the UN condemnation against Iraq. 373 In addition, the Reagan
administration halted sales of five chemical compounds to Iraq, and Iran, which at the
time had not been implicated in the use of chemical weapons. 374 The cessation of sales to
both countries intended to emphasize U.S. neutrality in the war. 375 Nonetheless, U.S.Iraqi relations progressed forward with increased U.S. economic and military aid to
support Iraq in the war while the Reagan administration ignored the end use of the
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provisions. No action, or official communique, emanated from the U.S. government to
specifically aid those Iraqi Kurds or Kurdish villages hit with chemical gas.
In a March 31, 1984, New York Times article, written by Bernard Gwertzman and
entitled “U.S. Restricts Sale of 5 Chemicals to Iraq After Poison Gas Report,” John
Hughes, the State Department spokesman, stated “in humanitarian terms, we cannot and
should not limit our attention to the victims of chemical weapons.” 376 Hughes further
added that Iran’s attempt to spread revolution throughout the region held the greatest
concern. The loss of life resulting from Iran’s exertions far outweighed any concern of
Saddam’s use of poisonous gas, which might affect civilian populations. In the same
article, other State Department officials claimed “that so far, Iraq had used nerve gas only
experimentally, not in a concerted fashion.” 377 Clearly, the Reagan administration
attempted to distance itself from Iraq’s end use of technologies sold through the U.S. and
its allies. Although the American Secretaries of State and Commerce adopted a change
in policy to scrutinize each export license application for its end purposes, within a year,
previously denied licenses started getting approved. 378 Part of the rationale for changing
course and loosening export controls stemmed from the overarching concern of the
Soviet Union gaining a foothold in the Gulf and the fear of Iran succeeding in the war.
Therefore, the alliance of convenience with Iraq entailed the Reagan administration
turning a blind eye to Iraqi use of chemical weapons.
AL-ANFAL
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The KDP and PUK remained adversaries during the Iran-Iraq War until 1986,
when Talabani came to the realization that Saddam had no intentions of signing any type
of Iraqi Kurdistan autonomy agreement with the PUK. 379 Bolstered by U.S., Soviet, and
French backing, and assured his regime would be sufficiently supported in the war,
Saddam concluded that concessions in the form of limited regional autonomy to the PUK
in exchange for continued assistance on the Kurdistan front no longer served his
purposes. 380 Talabani, thoroughly dissatisfied with Saddam’s stalling on signing an
autonomy agreement, changed political association and allied with the KDP against the
Iraqi regime. 381 With the KPD and PUK working in concert, and along with Iran, the
fighting against Iraqi forces intensified, particularly in the northern border regions with
Turkey and Iran. 382 Saddam retaliated with increasing ferocity in Kurdish population
areas.
The Iraqi regime stepped up its ongoing campaign of revenge massacres and
summary executions of Iraqi Kurds; abductions of Kurdish children, youth, and young
men for torture in hopes of garnering information on Peshmerga relatives and activities;
and, demolishing Kurdish villages. 383 In a concerted effort to reassert his government
control over Iraqi Kurdistan, Saddam appointed his kinsman, ʿAli Hasan al-Majid, later
dubbed Chemical Ali by Iraqis, as governor of the North on March 29, 1987. 384 A month
after his appointment, al-Majid ordered a chemical attack on the Kurdish villages of
Balisan and Shaykh Wassan, a prelude to the all-out assault yet to come. 385 The violent
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campaign against Iraqi Kurdish resistance, called al-Anfal (the spoils of war), began in
earnest in February 1988. 386 In a scorched earth policy devised by al-Majid, Iraqi forces
unloaded chemical bombs and high explosive air attacks on Peshmerga controlled
areas. 387 An area hit hard by aerial bombardment, the Jafati valley near Sulaymaniyah,
resulted in heavy casualties and devastation of the countryside. 388 The number of
fatalities sustained and the severity of the losses prompted Talabani to register a formal
accusation of genocide against the Iraqi regime. 389 Yet, al-Majid kept up with the use of
chemical weapons and heavy shelling to inflict as much destruction as possible in Iraqi
Kurdish areas. The Kurdish resistance began wearing down from such onslaughts. On
March 15, 1988, in retaliation for PUK and Iranian units capturing the town of Halabja,
the Iraqi military unleashed a barrage of shelling that far surpassed previous
offensives. 390 The afternoon’s air took on a smell of apples and garlic, and by the
following morning, over 5,000 people lay dead. 391 Forever etched in the Iraqi Kurdish
collective memory would be the massacre of Halabja.
The international response to Saddam’s use of chemical bombs and the
annihilation of thousands of Iraqi Kurds called for the condemnation of Iraq and the
immediate suspension of weapons and materials used in the manufacture of chemical
weapons. 392 As in the past, Saddam denied the use of chemical warfare. Further, he
refused entry of any investigative groups into Iraq as he considered any such examination
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meddling into his country’s internal affairs. 393 Once again, the Reagan administration
sponsored another UN Security Council resolution calling for tightening of export
controls on many items used in the development of chemical weapons. 394 The European
Parliament also issued a formal condemnation of Iraq’s application of chemical warfare
and extermination of thousands of Kurdish civilians. 395 Correspondingly, the United
States Congress delivered similar resolutions. But no sanctions were imposed by the
U.S., the UN, or the European Community. 396 Despite the White House publically
condemning Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds, the Reagan
administration continued with military planning support to Iraq. 397 In Patrick Tyler’s
New York Times article, entitled “Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq In War Despite Use Of
Gas,” Colonel Walther P. Lang, retired, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time,
stated both DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and CIA officials “were desperate to
make sure that Iraq did not lose.” 398 The Reagan administration clearly disregarded the
plight of Iraqi Kurds and the enormous loss of Kurdish civilian lives. Further, the White
House adopted a “no-contacts” policy towards the Iraqi Kurds. 399 When Talabani made a
visit to the State Department after the Halabja attack, Saddam registered strong
disapproval of U.S. officials meeting with his opposition. 400 On a second attempt to meet
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with State Department officials, Talabani received a resounding snub. 401 Once a strong
supporter of the Iraqi Kurds, the United States now flatly refused any help.
The end of the Iran-Iraq War occurred in July 1988 when Iran accepted the terms
laid out in the UN Security Council Resolution 598 of 1987. 402 Iraqi Kurdish morale,
devastated by Saddam’s policies and chemical warfare, sank further as Iraq could now
turn its full attention to the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan and retaliation against the
Kurds who fought against the regime during the war. The Iraqi Kurdish nationalist
movement, once again, floundered as sheer survival of the Kurdish population took
precedence. Physically and morally shattered, the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement, as
it had been, ceased to exist.
Reagan’s policies on the Persian Gulf greatly impacted Kurdish aims for
statehood. By ignoring the West’s sale of arms and chemicals to Iraq, and directly
providing those same materials to Saddam’s regime, the United States directly
contributed to the demise of the Iraqi Kurdish national movement. The Reagan
administration focused solely on building U.S.-Iraqi relations and preventing Iranian aims
of spreading Islamic fundamentalism than on implications of selling arms and chemicals
to Saddam’s regime. Without U.S. assistance, through the restoration of U.S.-Iraqi
diplomatic relations and the issuance of Commodity Credit guarantees, Saddam’s ability
to purchase materials and weaponry would have been severely diminished. The sale of
U.S. dual-use technologies allowed Saddam’s regime to develop and deploy chemical
agents on Iraqi Kurdish villages and Peshmerga outposts, which ultimately devastated the
population and the countryside. Despite reports of Iraq’s use of chemical warfare, the
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U.S. ignored the warnings, continued to sell Saddam armament and chemical agents, and
neglected to sanction Iraq for its use of chemical weapons. Ultimately, the United States’
policy on Iraq inflicted a disastrous blow to the Kurdish nationalist movement. Despite
the devastation to the movement, and the scattering of tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurds to
other countries, the struggle for autonomy lived on to see a renewed quest for self-rule.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The Iraqi Kurds’ quest for a nation state began after the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire in the early twentieth century. They showed remarkable resilience, and continue
to do so, in the face of adversity brought about by Middle East regional and international
powers that imposed policies in favor of provincial governments that reinforced imperial
authority prior to and during World War II. In the Cold War era, when America’s
strategic interest in the Middle East increased and centered on containment of Soviet
encroachment and easy accessibility to oil, the Iraqi Kurds played a tactical yet
subservient role in U.S. strategies devised to back America’s interests and those of its
Middle East allies. Those U.S. policies capitalized on Iraqi Kurdish aims for autonomy,
while neglecting to back the Kurds’ political ambitions. Beginning with America’s
Persian Gulf policy that upheld Iranian supremacy in the region, the U.S. exploited Iraqi
Kurd’s goals by secretly arranging financial aid and military weaponry through Iran and
Israel. America’s interest in the Iraqi Kurds hinged on keeping Iran regionally and
politically strong thereby encouraging Iraqi Kurds in open rebellion against Iraqi forces
to Iran’s advantage. Construed by Iraqi Kurds as support for their goal, the initial
diplomatic contact between U.S. officials and KDP leadership in 1972 buoyed Kurdish
ambitions. However, U.S. interest only resided with continuing Iranian hegemony in the
Gulf and not with the Kurdish nationalist movement. Although providing for aid to Iraqi
Kurdish fighters, the U.S. declined any formal, or informal, backing for Kurdish
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autonomy. America’s encouragement to the KDP centered on satisfying the Shah’s
request for assistance to the Iraqi Kurds in his battle with the Iraqi regime, not in
providing diplomatic support for a separate Kurdish state. The U.S. possessed no interest
in the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement as America saw no benefit to the U.S. in Iraqi
Kurdish autonomy. In fact, the arming of the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion against the Baʿthist
state characterized another military mechanism in the Shah’s arsenal in his battle with
Iraq over the Shatt al-ʿArab, and maintaining his regional power. White House support to
the Iraqi Kurds balanced on the U.S. maintaining a good relationship with the Shah. At
no time did a push for an independent state for Iraqi Kurds play into U.S. policy decisions
in the Gulf region. The purpose served by the U.S. backing the Iraqi Kurds rested on
continuing positive U.S.-Iranian relations.
Following the Iranian Revolution, the severance of U.S.-Iranian relations, and the
onset of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist movement again suffered severe
consequences from America’s Middle East policy. As U.S. policy in the Gulf region
tilted towards Saddam’s regime in an effort to counter the perceived threat from Islamic
fundamentalism, the Iraqi Kurds’ rebellion against the Iraqi central government and
ambition for autonomy collided with America’s evolving relations with Saddam’s
regime. Despite lacking any noteworthy diplomatic, military, or economic support from
foreign entities, the Iraqi Kurds continued to skirmish with Iraqi forces along the
Kurdistan borders. For Iraqi Kurds, the nationalist movement persisted despite the
intense infighting between the two major competing groups, the KDP and the PUK, and
the battle for daily survival against Saddam’s forces. The U.S. monitored Iraqi Kurdish
activity, but determined they posed no threat to Baghdad. With America’s Persian Gulf
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policy in the region centered on the ready availability of oil, Cold War concerns, and
stemming the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, supporting the Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist
movement offered no additional benefits to the U.S. in terms of achieving America’s
objectives in the Persian Gulf. In general, Iraqi Kurdish autonomy held no sway in
America’s Middle East policy. Particularly in light of burgeoning of U.S.-Iraqi relations,
the Iraqi Kurds proved inconsequential to the larger scheme of thwarting Iran and
advancing Iraq’s military gains in the Gulf. With the U.S. intent on affording Iraq an
upper hand in the Iran-Iraq War, the removal of Saddam’s regime from the State
Sponsors of Terrorism list and the subsequent issuance of U.S. Agriculture Department
Commodity Credit guarantees allowed for the sale of chemicals and dual-use
technologies to Iraq. In spite of repeated warnings from several of its own governmental
agencies, and backed up by UN reports, the U.S. continued to supply Iraq with chemicals
and technologies, which Saddam weaponized and utilized on his own citizens, the Iraqi
Kurds. Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, much of which the United States provided, killed
thousands of Iraqi Kurds and made hundreds of Kurdish villages uninhabitable. The
extermination of both Iraqi Kurdish villagers and fighters, and the devastation of homes
and the countryside wrought by additional aerial bombardments by Iraqi forces, crushed
the physical ability and emotional fortitude of Iraqi Kurds to carry on with ambitions for
autonomy and an independent state. Although the United States, the UN, and the
European Parliament passed resolutions condemning Iraq for its chemical weapons use,
no sanctions resulted from such use against Saddam’s regime. U.S. policy on Iraq during
the Iran-Iraq War constituted a direct threat to the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement.
By disregarding the implications of selling dual-use chemicals and technologies to Iraq,
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the United States implicated itself, alongside Saddam, in the downfall of the Iraqi
Kurdish nationalist movement.
During the Cold War period from the Nixon era through the Reagan years, U.S.
policy in the Persian Gulf region negatively impacted the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist
movement. From exploitative, covert ventures on behalf of Iran to chemical and
weapons sales to Iraq, the United States’ Gulf policies carelessly and damagingly
influenced Iraqi Kurdish ambitions. In devising those policies on behalf of regional
powers and capitalizing on Iraqi Kurdish aims, the United States indifferently obstructed
the nationalist movement. Although the movement resurfaced in later years with some
success, U.S. involvement continued along the same lines of limited support with no
overt diplomatic backing. The Kurdish proverb, “The only friends we have are the
mountains,” holds true. 403
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